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Disability policies have recently gained a lot of attention in OECD countries 
as the disability insurance system has become one of the main obstacles in the 
attempts of raising (or preventing the fall of) labour force participation rates in 
developed economies. Many reforms have been introduced across the OECD in 
order to activate the unemployed and to abolish early retirement schemes, which 
coupled with the sustained economic growth has led to decreases in 
unemployment rates. However, these positive developments have translated in 
increases in the disability rolls, particularly so for older workers. Figure 1 shows 
that, on average, 6% of the OECD working-age population was receiving disability 
benefits in 2007 but, for some countries like Sweden or Norway disability 
recipiency rates reach the 10%, which is a higher number than unemployment rates 
for these countries. Only the countries that have introduced policy changes which 
successfully managed to tighten access to disability benefits like The Netherlands, 
Poland or Luxemburg have experienced significant declines in beneficiary rates in 
recent years.  
Figure 1 Disability benefit recipiency rates: disability benefit recipients in percent of the population 
aged 20-64 in 28 OECD countries, mid-1990s and latest available year1. 
 
Source:  OECD high-level  forum on Sickness,  Disabil ity and Work, May 2009.  
                                                           
1 2004 for France, 2005 for Luxembourg, 2006 for Denmark, Italy, Japan, the Slovak Republic and the 
United States. 1996 for Belgium and Canada, 1999 for The Netherlands, 2000 for Hungary and Italy, 
2001 for Ireland, 2003 for Japan and 2004 for Poland. 
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As a parallel development to this increase in recipiency rates, it has been 
extensively documented that employment rates of disabled individuals have 
remained at very low levels despite increases in the GDP during the past decade in 
most OECD countries. In Figure 2 we observe that, on average across the OECD in 
the mid-2000s, employment rates of people with disability only managed to reach 
42% compared to the 75% level of people without disability. Despite some attempts 
in a number of countries to implement employment integration measures for 
individuals with disabilities, their employment rates have not substantially 
improved.  
Figure 2 Employment rates of the working-age population with disability in 27 OECD countries, 
mid-1990s and mid-2000s. 
 
Source:  OECD high-level  forum on Sickness,  Disabil ity and Work, May 2009.  
Therefore, both national and international authorities have recognized the 
need to control the inflow into disability benefit programs and to introduce policies 
that prove effective in promoting the reintegration in the labour market of those 
beneficiaries that keep some remaining capacity to work.  
The immediate consequence of these high inflow rates into disability 
benefits and the low employment and outflow rates from the system, is the 
extremely high benefit spending on disability. We can see in Table 1 that, on 
average, OECD countries spend 1.2% of GDP on disability benefits but this figure 
more than doubles for countries like Sweden (2.5%), Norway (2.6%) or The 
Netherlands (2.4%). If we add sickness expenditures to spending on disability 
benefits, the figure can reach the 5% level of the GDP and it more than doubles 
what is spent on unemployment benefits. 
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Table 1 Trends in expenditure on disability and sickness programs, in percentage of GDP, 1999, 2000 
and 2005, and in percentage of unemployment benefit spending and total public spending, 2005. 
  Disability   Sickness  Disability and sickness 
 
  
% 
GDP 
     
% 
GDP
     
% 
GDP
   
% Unem-
ployment 
 
% Public  
social 
spend 
 1990 2000 2005  1990 2000 2005  1990 2000 2005  2005  2005 
Australia 1.1 1.2 1.3   0.5 1.8 1.3  1.6 3.0 2.5  463   15 
Austria 1.8 1.1 1.3  1.3 1.1 1.0  3.1 2.3 2.4  221  9 
Belgium 1.4 1.2 1.4   1.4 0.7 0.7  2.8 1.9 2.1  72   8 
Canada 0.4 0.4 0.4  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.4 0.4 0.4  65  2 
Czech 
Republic 1.2 1.1 1.1   1.0 1.2 1.0  2.3 2.3 2.1  355   11 
Denmark 1.6 1.5 1.8  1.4 1.1 1.3  2.9 2.6 3.1  231  11 
Finland 2.1 1.8 1.9   1.5 1.2 1.2  3.6 3.0 3.1  194   12 
France 0.9 0.8 0.9  0.6 0.7 0.8  1.6 1.5 1.6  99  6 
Germany 0.8 1.0 0.9   1.9 1.6 1.3  2.7 2.5 2.2  148   8 
Greece 1.0 0.7 0.7  0.8 0.7 0.6  1.9 1.4 1.3  329  6 
Hungary .. 0.2 0.2   .. 0.7 0.7  .. 1.0 0.9  190   4 
Iceland 0.9 1.7 2.2  1.5 1.4 1.5  2.3 3.1 3.6  1.183  22 
Ireland 0.5 0.6 0.7   0.8 0.6 0.7  1.3 1.1 1.5  163   9 
Italy 1.2 0.9 0.8  0.9 0.7 0.5  2.1 1.6 1.3  324  5 
Japan 0.3 0.3 0.3   0.1 0.1 0.1  0.4 0.4 0.4  125   2 
Korea 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1  0.2 0.2 0.2  104  3 
Luxemb. 2.0 1.7 1.6   0.6 0.6 0.9  2.6 2.3 2.5  324   11 
Mexico 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  ..  .. 
Netherls. 4.7 2.7 2.4   2.9 2.2 2.3  7.6 4.9 4.6  303   22 
New 
Zealand 0.6 0.9 1.0  0.3 0.3 0.3  0.9 1.2 1.3  302  7 
Norway 2.5 2.3 2.6   2.6 2.7 2.4  5.1 5.1 4.9  960   23 
Poland 2.1 2.2 1.6  0.7 0.7 0.6  2.8 3.0 2.3  821  11 
Portugal 1.7 1.8 1.8   0.0 0.0 0.0  1.7 1.8 1.8  157   8 
Slovak 
Republic .. 0.9 0.9  .. 1.0 0.3  .. 1.9 1.2  672  7 
Spain 1.2 1.2 1.1   1.0 1.0 1.1  2.2 2.2 2.2  103   11 
Sweden 1.9 2.1 2.5  3.1 2.0 1.7  5.0 4.1 4.2  353  14 
Switz. 1.0 1.8 2.1   1.2 1.1 1.0  2.2 2.8 3.2  339   16 
Turkey 0.1 0.2 0.1  0.1 0.0 0.0  0.1 0.2 0.1  232  1 
United 
Kingdom 1.6 2.1 1.8   0.6 0.7 0.5  2.2 2.8 2.3  904   11 
United 
States 0.5 0.6 0.7  0.8 0.6 0.7  1.3 1.2 1.4  483  9 
OECD 1.3 1.2 1.2   1.0 0.9 0.8  2.3 2.1 2.0  248   10 
 
Source:  OECD high-level  forum on Sickness,  Disabil ity and Work, May 2009.  
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Moreover, spending on disability benefits has, in general, either been kept at 
a relatively constant level or it has been increasing during recent years as a result 
of the permanent nature of this kind of benefits, which adds extra difficulties when 
trying to reduce this source of public expenditure. This is a very important 
observation to take into account in times of economic crisis like the current ones as 
reductions of spending on disability benefits are only possible through strong re-
organization of the access and revision process of the benefit structure (some of 
these reforms are analyzed and suggested in the 3rd and 4th chapter of this thesis for 
the Spanish case).   
With the objective of reducing expenditures on disability benefits in mind, 
several countries have begun to introduce policy changes in their disability 
systems and the OECD has created a “Sickness, Disability and Work” group that 
publishes evaluations of these policy changes and recommendations about the 
main challenges for each of the OECD countries in terms of disability policies. 
For the case of Spain, the OECD highlights the success obtained in keeping 
recipiency rates under the 4%, a level which is well below the OECD average of 
6%. However, at the same time, the OECD also confirms the failure of employment 
integration policies for workers with disabilities, which have been unable to 
significally modify the high unemployment and low employment rates of 
disability beneficiaries in Spain (despite a small increase in employment rates in 
recent years as can be observed in Figure 2). 
This study addresses three issues in understanding the labour market 
situation of disabled individuals in Spain and the sources of this situation as well 
as assessing the effect of two policy initiatives on the labour market prospects and 
behavior of disabled individuals. 
The first part of the study focuses on the inflow into disability benefits for 
older individuals approaching retirement age. More precisely, it analyzes the 
determinants of labour market transitions from employment to unemployment, 
inactivity and disability for individuals aged 45-59 in Spain. The aim of this first 
part is to determine the extent to which the business cycle, both at the local and 
national level, affects transitions from employment to disability benefits for 
individuals approaching retirement age. The second and third parts focus only on 
the group of individuals in the disability rolls and they try to assess the effect of 
two policies. The policy analyzed in the second part was introduced in 2004 in 
order to promote the labour market integration of disabled women and it granted 
deductions to the social security contributions for employers that hired disabled 
women. On the other hand, the policy that is the object of study of the third part 
allows for a 36% increase in the amount of benefits to partially disabled individuals 
who are older than 55 years old and for which it is deemed to be difficult to find a 
16 
 
job. The aim of this third part is to assess the disincentives to work introduced by 
the increase in the benefits. 
Starting from the little that was know from previous publications about the 
labour market situation of disabled individuals in Spain2, this study addresses 
three specific issues related to the steps specified above: 
• The impact of the business cycle at the local and national level on entries 
into the disability system for older individuals approaching retirement age 
in Spain. 
• The effectiveness of using deductions to the Social Security contributions 
for employers as a labour market integration policy targeted to a specific 
part of the disabled population, in this case disabled women. 
• The disincentives to work embedded in increases in the levels of benefits 
given to partially disabled individuals. 
Each issue is tackled in an independent chapter which contributes to a 
specific literature. The following sections explain in further detail the methodology 
used in the analysis and the contribution of each of the parts to the academic 
debate. 
1.1 Business Cycle Effects on Labour Force Transitions 
for Older People in Spain 
During the 1970s and 1980s governments focused on the promotion of early 
retirement schemes in an attempt to increase employment for younger workers. As 
a result of this policy, labour force participation rates of older individuals dropped 
and the authorities realized that there was a need to change this strategy in order 
to preserve the financial stability of the Social Security systems and to compensate 
for the graying of the labour force. Consequently, activation policies were 
introduced as well as limitations to access the early retirement schemes. However, 
activity rates of older people did not recover as alternative routes were found by 
these workers to exit the labour market, mainly through the unemployment and 
disability schemes.  
If we take into consideration that in Spain 70% of individuals receiving 
disability benefits are older workers, the need to study these alternative routes of 
leaving the labour force before reaching the retirement age (as a source of covered 
pre-retirement) becomes of major importance for the planning and designing of 
activation policies for older individuals. 
                                                           
2 A complete literature review from previous publications is given in each chapter. 
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Although exits from employment occur throughout the business cycle, it is a 
known fact that, in times of economic downturns, more people lose their jobs and 
one way for firms to adjust to the changing economic environment is through 
(voluntary or involuntary) restructuration of the older part of the labour force. 
Therefore, this exogenous variation in business cycle conditions represents a very 
useful tool for us to analyze the relative use of these alternative routes of leaving 
the labour force before retirement for the case of older workers. The results of this 
study will also be important to be incorporated by policy-makers when designing 
policy changes to the unemployment and disability benefit schemes, as some 
unforeseen secondary effects of these changes could occur if the connection 
between these exits routes is not included in the policy analysis. 
Therefore, in this chapter we analyze the determinants of observed exits 
from employment for people aged 45-59 years old in the context of the Spanish 
labour market in 1981-2006. The main aim of the paper is to identify the effect of 
the business cycle (BC) at the regional and national level on the timing and the 
type of exit route out of the labour force. 
We proceed in two stages. In the first stage, we study the determinants of 
exits from employment to non-employment. In the second, we take into account 
the fact that there are three competing exit routes (unemployment, inactivity and 
disability) and estimate a competing risk duration model to evaluate the 
importance of BC conditions in determining the respective exit probabilities. We 
make use of the recently released Muestra Continua de Vidas Labourales to 
estimate discrete time hazard regression models. We match this information with a 
number of variables constructed with macroeconomic data derived from the 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística to measure growth and employability 
performance of different economic sectors and regions in Spain in order to capture 
the variation in the business cycle between times, sectors and regions. Time-
varying covariates are also included in the analysis to model the monetary 
incentives provided by the system. Finally, we also include some age dummies to 
capture the effect of a number of special schemes included in the unemployment 
and disability legislation in order to check whether they have an impact on the 
timing and the choice of route out of the labour market. 
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1.2 Promoting Employment of Disabled Women in 
Spain: Evaluating a Policy 
The Social Security system in Spain provides four different types of 
permanent disability benefits which are granted according to the severity of the 
disabling condition and the remaining capacity to work that is left for these 
individuals. Therefore, the system is designed to allow for a certain part of the 
disabled individuals to work while receiving the disability pension. However, data 
reveals that the majority of these individuals do not effectively work and 
employment rates for this group of people have remained very low since 1996. 
Among the policy initiatives in place that aim to promote the labour market 
integration of disabled individuals in Spain we can highlight an antidiscrimination 
law that dates from the 1983, an employment quota of 2% of the working force 
covered by individuals with disabilities for firms of more than 50 employees and 
deductions to the Social Security contributions paid by the employer that hires a 
disabled worker. Isolating and identifying the effect of antidiscrimination policies 
on employment of disabled individuals is rather complicated and, on the other 
hand, it is widely acknowledged that the 2% employment quota is not enforced in 
the Spanish market. Therefore, the aim of this research is to evaluate the results of 
an employment promotion policy introduced in 2004 which increased the 
deductions to the Social Security contributions paid by the employer that hire a 
disabled woman.  
In order to do that, we first analyze employment rates of disabled 
individuals in Spain from 1996 until 2007 followed by the estimation of a bivariate 
probit model to evaluate the existence of shifts in employment trends in the 
women relative to the men sample conditioning on the existence of preexisting 
trends. We choose a bivariate probit model to fit our data in order to take into 
account the crucial role played by the different degrees of disability benefits 
available in the system and, apart from the dependent variable that captures the 
labour market situation of the individual, we also include another equation that 
captures the type of disability pension (partial or total) received by the individual. 
As the residuals in both equations are not independent, we model them 
simultaneously and allow for the correlation in the unobserved factors of the two 
equations.  
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1.3 Employment Effects of Increasing Disability 
Benefits: A Regression Discontinuity Approach 
The availability and generosity of disability insurance systems has increased 
in recent decades in most OECD countries but with sustained economic growth in 
most of these economies, the raise in the financial resources targeted to these 
programs did not translate into a political problem for a long time3. However, this 
situation will certainly change as a result of the financial crisis of the last three 
years and the constraints placed on government’s budgets due to increases in 
unemployment insurance schemes and other social assistance programs. Disability 
systems have, nonetheless, received continuous criticism as they are blamed for 
introducing disincentives to work for part of the disabled population. A large 
literature has emerged in countries like the USA and The Netherlands4 that tried to 
quantify these disincentives and there is nowadays a certain degree of agreement 
about the existence of disincentive effects to work provided by the disability 
schemes. However, there is still some disagreement on the size of these effects. 
For the case of Spain, a report from the OECD published in 2007 clearly 
defined the improvement of the work incentives for older workers with partial 
disability as one of the four main recommendations to the Spanish authorities in 
the area of disability policies (OECD 2007). However, no reform in this direction 
has been implemented since this recommendation was issued in 2007. Moreover, 
the disincentives to work embedded in the Spanish disability system have never 
been properly analyzed in the literature, primarily due to the lack of data 
availability. 
Therefore, the aim of this research is to analyze the employment effects of a 
law that provides for a 36% increase in the generosity of disability benefits in Spain 
for claimants who are, as a result of their lack of skills and of the labour market 
conditions they face, deemed unlikely to find a job.  
The main problem in analyzing the existence of employment effects resides 
in the fact that disabled individuals with the lowest probability of being employed 
are also the ones that are more likely to be given the increase in the benefit amount 
(treatment). Therefore, this selection issue makes it more complicated to obtain 
unbiased results of the size of the disincentive effects introduced by the policy. 
                                                           
3 However, it must be noted that some countries (such as Denmark, Luxemburg or The Netherlands) 
started implementing reforms to the sickness and disability systems a few years ago in an attempt to 
reduce the generosity of these systems. For a description and revision of the main changes implemented 
in OECD countries, refer to OECD, 2009. 
4 See, for example, Börsch-Supan, 1998 and Autor and Duggan, 2003. More detailed information on the 
literature on the topic is given in the literature review of chapter 4. 
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Simple models that do not take into account this selection will result in 
overestimation of the policy effect. On the other hand, models that control and 
match on observable characteristics of the disabled individuals and the region in 
which they live will reduce the bias of the estimated coefficients, as part of the 
selection into the policy depends on these observables features. However, if 
disabled individuals are also selected into the policy following a number of 
characteristics that are not observable by the researcher (such as attachment to the 
labour market or relative degree of disability) these models will still present biased 
results.  
For these reasons, we exploit the discontinuity of the policy implementation 
at the age of 55 which allows us to use regression discontinuity models to take into 
account the influence and selection on both observable and unobservable variables. 
This technique relies on the simple assumption that the distribution of disabled 
individuals around this eligibility threshold is relatively random in order to get the 
impact of the increase in the disability benefits on re-employment rates (Marie and 
Machin forthcoming; Chen and Van Der Klaauw, 2008). We use both traditional 
regression discontinuity models and we also include some specifications in which 
we restrict the sample to individuals who joined the disability rolls before turning 
55 years old. We introduce these new specifications of the model due to the 
existence of non-linearities in the covariate age at which individuals enter the 
disability insurance system. 
1.4 The Database; Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales 
For the three chapters of this thesis, we make use of the same database for 
the empirical analysis. It is an administrative dataset called Muestra Continua de 
Vidas Laborales based on a random draw from the Spanish Social Security records, 
which contains a sample of 4% of all affiliated employed and unemployed workers 
and pensioners for the year 2007. For this group of people, it reproduces the entire 
work and pensions experience so that the dataset contains information for 
approximately 1.2 million people and covers their entire labour and pension 
history.  
This sampling exercise has been repeated in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 with 
the aim of keeping the panel structure of the database so that for each new year, 
there is an actualization of the information of the individuals included in the wave 
of the previous year. Therefore, for these individuals, the potential problem of 
selection bias is reduced and the representativeness of the sample is maintained 
with new individuals being added each year. However, at the same time, 
individuals that die or that stop having a job or receiving unemployment or 
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pension benefits from the Social Security administration for the whole year, will 
disappear from the sample5.    
1.5 Outline 
In addition to this introductory chapter, this dissertation comprises three 
more chapters (chapters 2 to 4), a concluding chapter (chapter 5) and a reference 
list. 
In the conclusion we highlight the main findings of each paper and the way 
in which they provide new information on the labour market situation of disabled 
individuals in Spain. We also point out the potential policy implications derived 
from this study and the issues that are left for future work. 
                                                           
5 Some recent studies have focused on the analysis of these attrition cases in order to provide an 
assessment of the potential importance for the maintenance of the representativeness of the sample (see 
García-Perez, 2008). 

 2. Business Cycle Effects on 
Labour Force Transitions for 
Older People in Spain 
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2.1 Introduction6 
Labour market policies and legislation are evolving over time in response to 
changing economic and demographic conditions around the world and, for a long 
time, European governments focused on promoting early retirement for older 
workers, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, in order to generate job 
opportunities and reduce unemployment for younger workers.  
However, because of the huge number of older workers taking advantage of 
the early retirement option and because of the consequent substantial decrease in 
both the activity and labour force participation rates of the older population, this 
policy soon proved to have a number of problematic and unforeseen effects. At the 
same time, society was ageing due to increased life expectancy and reduced 
fertility rates, and this only exacerbated the problem (Fischer et al. 2006).    
As a result of these two parallel developments, there was an increase in the 
financial pressure of the social security system and on taxes of the working 
population in relation to the non-working one. 
As the ageing of society is being regarded as one of the most important social 
and economic challenges for Europe in recent times, these developments have 
prompted a shift in policy focus towards ways of delaying retirement and of 
keeping older workers economically active in the labour market. To achieve this 
goal, governments introduced several policies such as incentives for the firms that 
hire older workers or limitations in the accession rules to these early retirement 
schemes. However, these efforts have not translated into increases in activity rates 
of older workers because many of these workers are able to find alternative 
programs to leave the labour market, such as the disability or unemployment 
schemes, before reaching the retirement or early retirement age. Therefore, these 
other possibilities of leaving employment should be studied and understood so 
that they can be integrated in the analysis when designing policies to keep older 
workers active in the labour market. 
The literature analyzing labour market transitions usually identifies a 
collection of factors as potential determinants of these transitions, ranging from 
individual-specific determinants, employer, firm and industry characteristics or 
business cycle conditions to incentives embedded in the Social Security institutions 
(See for example Garcia-Perez et al.2007, 2008, Blanco 2000). It is important to 
understand the incentives to withdraw from the labour force provided by each of 
these factors in order to devise effective labour market policy reforms.  
                                                           
6 This chapter is based on: Jimenez-Martin, S. & J. Vall-Castello (2009). Business cycle effects on labour 
force transitions for older people in Spain. FEDEA Working Paper 2009-25, Madrid, Spain. 
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Therefore, our aim in this paper is to identify the different incidence of each 
of these factors on labour force exit behaviour among Spanish workers aged 45-59 
distinguishing between exits to unemployment, disability benefits or inactivity. We 
will pay special attention to the role of the business cycle on the inflow into 
disability benefits, the monetary incentives provided by the system and the relative 
power of age-based legislation schemes in inducing transitions between these 
labour force states.  
The current study contributes to the body of literature that focuses on labour 
market transitions through the analysis of transitions from employment to 
unemployment, disability benefits and inactivity of Spanish workers aged 45-59 
and incorporating as regressors a rich set of variables describing the firm and 
sector in which the individual is employed, business cycle indicators both at the 
sector and regional level and age-specific dummies in order to capture the 
incentives provided by some special schemes included in the Social Security 
legislation. The analysis is conducted separately for men and women due to the 
different evolution of the main labour market variables, such as participation rates, 
between the two genders.  
Our results show the strategic use of disability benefits by older workers 
approaching retirement as an alternative means of leaving the labour market when 
the economic situation of the country deteriorates and economic growth slows 
down. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 revises the literature on the topic 
while section 3 describes and analyzes the evolution of the main labour market and 
economic indicators in Spain during the last 30 years paying special attention to 
the group of workers with ages comprised between 45-59 years old. Section 4 
describes the Spanish legislation on unemployment and disability benefits focusing 
on those schemes specifically applicable to older people. Section 5 presents the two 
econometric models that are used for the analysis, which are the single exit logistic 
hazard model and the competing risk model.  Section 6 explains the database used 
for the analysis, the sample selection criteria and the variables included. In part 7, 
we present the results of both the non-parametric analysis, in terms of empirical 
hazard rate graphs, and the parametric analysis. Finally, some concluding remarks 
are included in the last section of the chapter. 
2.2 Literature 
The issue of the effect of the business cycle on labour force participation 
behaviour has not received much attention in the Spanish literature mainly 
because of the difficulty of combining macroeconomic and microeconomic data in 
a coherent way.  However, workers’ participation decisions during expansionary 
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or recessionary periods are crucial for understanding how labour markets adjust to 
macroeconomic fluctuations (Darby et al, 1998).  At the same time, the economic 
environment also affects the performance of the firms operating in the labour 
market which make their decisions on labour demand needs partly based on the 
economic conditions of the country. Furthermore, the effect of the business cycle 
on firm performance is usually heterogeneous among economic sectors and 
regional units of a single country. In this paper, we try to capture these differences 
with a number of variables that describe labour market conditions and economic 
and industrial growth at the sector and regional level.   
Most of the literature that analyzes the effect of the business cycle on labour 
market participation rates approaches the topic from a macroeconomic point of 
view. These studies usually choose the unemployment rate as a proxy for the 
business cycle and they evaluate its effects on participation rates in a panel data 
setting using a pool of different countries. Their findings usually suggest that 
participation rates are lower during recessionary times. However, macroeconomic 
time-series data are not enough to identify the causal effect behind an individual’s 
behaviour, as information on workers’ characteristics and choices is not available. 
At the same time, the problem with microeconomic surveys is that they are not 
long enough so as to capture the effect of the business cycle. Therefore, studies 
using this kind of microeconomic survey data usually include one additional 
regressor (calendar time) to control for the business cycle7 (Van den Berg et al, 
2000). In this chapter, our data (administrative records) allows us to reconstruct the 
entire working history of the individuals, which we combine with a number of 
business cycle indicators constructed with macroeconomic data. This process 
results in a better identification of the causal effects of the economic conditions on 
individual’s behaviour.  
The effects of labour market institutions on labour market transitions at 
advanced ages have been widely studied in the literature (see Gruber and Wise, 
1999, for a cross-country comparison). In the case of Spain, Boldrin et al. (1999, 
2004) show the strong incentives to retire early provided by the Spanish Social 
Security legislation for individuals with below average working histories and/or 
low wages. This finding explains the strong increase in the number of early retirees 
in Spain during the 1990s. Two more papers by Kugler et al. (2003) and Garcia-
Perez et al. (2007) focus on the impact of a reform in 1997 of the labour market 
legislation on transitions into a permanent contract. In the spirit of Boldrin et al. 
(2004), Argimon et al. (2007) find that the Social Security Wealth variable has a 
positive impact on retirement decisions using a reduced-form duration model and 
Cairo (2007) employs a competing risk model to study transitions to early and 
                                                           
7 With microeconomic data, it is usually assumed that the duration of employment is independent of 
business cycle conditions when the number of periods analyzed is relatively small.  
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partial retirement for men between 60 and 70 years old in 2005. She includes two 
variables, Social Security Wealth and Social Security Accrual, to model monetary 
incentives and finds evidence that Social Security incentives do affect retirement 
decisions.   
The effects of the Spanish unemployment legislation on re-employment 
probabilities and on the duration of the spell of unemployment have been studied 
by Bover at al. (2002) and Jenkins et al. (2004). The paper by Bover et al. analyzes 
the effects of both unemployment benefits and the business cycle on 
unemployment durations for the period 1987-1994 using the Spanish Labour Force 
Survey (EPA) for men aged 20 to 64. Their conclusions suggest that the hazard rate 
of leaving unemployment is higher with favourable business cycle conditions and 
lower for individuals receiving unemployment benefits (as opposed to 
unemployed individuals who are not entitled to benefits). The paper by Jenkins et 
al. (2004) focuses on the effects of the unemployment benefit level on the re-
employment probabilities of Spanish men aged 20 to 59 between 1987 and 1991 
and finds that benefits do affect unemployment durations but that the level of 
these benefits has only a small disincentive effect on re-employment probabilities. 
Business cycle conditions are also found to have an impact on re-employment rates 
of unemployed workers. 
On the other hand, Garcia-Perez and Sanchez-Martin (2007) restrict their 
analysis to older people and their paper explores the monetary incentives 
embedded in the Social Security institutions to stay unemployed. They use Spanish 
data to estimate the parameters of a theoretical model of job search behaviour and 
conclude that both labour market conditions and institutional incentives play a 
very important role in explaining the search behaviour of unemployed individuals 
between 55-65 years old in Spain. For people in this age range, remaining 
unemployed is found to be the best strategy given the level of unemployment 
benefits and the penalties associated with the early retirement option. 
Another strand of the literature has focused on the alternative of leaving 
employment and claiming a disability pension. The paper by Jimenez-Martin et al. 
(2006) investigates the effects of permanent disability benefits on labour market 
behaviour of people aged 45-59 in Spain. The results seem to prove that the 
disability option has been used as a form of exit from the labour market for 
individuals substantially close to the early retirement age who do not fulfil the 
requirements to access this route, as some of these individuals are found to receive 
disability benefits without deserving them.    
Blanco (2000) estimates a competing risk duration model to study the 
decision of individuals between 50 and 64 years of age to leave the labour force 
and either take early retirement benefits or claim disability benefits. In her paper, 
Blanco does not include a variable to measure the monetary incentives of the Social 
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Security System but she incorporates a number of labour demand variables 
describing the firm and sector in which the individual is employed. Her findings 
suggest that both the decision to retire and the decision to claim disability benefits 
are very much affected by the type of job and the level of income of the last job. In 
that sense, she finds that individuals with higher levels of income in the last job try 
to delay both the date of retirement and entries into the disability system as they 
try to remain active in the labour market. On the other hand, workers in the 
manufacturing and public sector have higher hazard rates to early retirement 
while self-employed and public sector workers exhibit higher hazard rates into 
disability benefits. 
2.3 Determinants of labour force transitions for workers 
aged 45-59 in Spain 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show Spanish labour force participation rates and 
unemployment rates for men and women aged 45-59 from 1987 to 2007. Figure 3 
shows dramatic falls in the labour force participation rate for men during the late 
eighties and mid nineties following, to some extent, the business cycle and 
resulting in strong increases in the unemployment rate for this group of workers 
during this period.  Since 1995 labour participation rates have recovered 
somewhat8 but participation has not been as high as it was in the late 1980’s, while 
unemployment rates have been steadily decreasing since the mid nineties. In 2001, 
and for the first time since the 1980’s, a decrease in participation rates is not 
followed by an increase in the unemployment rate (although, as can be seen in 
Figure 5, there is an increase in the number of disability benefits granted to 
individuals aged 45-59 from 2001). Figure 4 shows a very different trend for 
women in the age bracket 45-59: in a comparable period of time the labour force 
participation rate for women has increased steadily whereas the unemployment 
rate has followed a similar pattern than the unemployment rate for men aged 45-
59. This increase in the participation rate can be explained by the generational 
change that resulted in a replacement of low educated older women by more 
educated younger women in the same age bracket9.   
                                                           
8 The jump in 2002 is due to a methodological change in the Spanish labour force survey. 
9 This is the explanation that seems to prevail in the literature for the case of Spain. However, some 
studies conducted in other European countries have found that cohort effects are also very relevant in 
explaining the rise in women’s participation rates as younger cohorts of women tend to have more 
liberal social norms with respect to paid employment and to face more favorable child care facilities (see 
Vendrik and Cörvers, 2009; Balleer et al. 2009 and Euwals et al. 2007).  
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Figure 3 Unemployment and labour force participation for men aged 45-59 in Spain, from 1987-
200710. 
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Figure 4 Unemployment and labour force participation for women aged 45-59 in Spain, from 1987-
200711. 
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Source:  Spanish National Institute of Statistics:  “Encuesta Poblacion Activa” (EPA). 
                                                           
10 This is 3-month interval data. 
11 Although the scale of the graph of labour force participation rate for women is greater than that for 
men, the evolution is much less erratic than it is for men. Even if we decrease the scale of the graph of 
women, there is no different pattern observed during the crisis years (as it is the case for men). 
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Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the way in which both the unemployment rate 
and the inflow into disability benefits react to business cycle conditions. In Figure 
5, we can see that both the unemployment rate and the number of new disability 
benefits granted to workers aged 45-59 strongly increased during the first half of 
the nineties when the GDP growth dropped to negative numbers for the first time 
since the 1980’s. However, since 2000 these two variables have showed an opposite 
evolution with the unemployment rate remaining reasonable constant between 6% 
and 8% and the number of new disability benefits granted to this group of workers 
increasing steadily until 2007.  
Figure 5 Unemployment rate and new disability benefits granted each year to individuals aged 45-59 
in Spain, from 1980-2008. 
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Source:  Unemployment rate  of individuals aged 45-59:  Spanish National Institute of  
Statistics (EPA),  Number disabil i ty benefits granted each year to individuals aged 45-
59:  Own calculations from MCVL. 
Figure 6 reflects the relation between the number of benefits granted to 
workers aged 45-59 and the business cycle. It can be observed that there is a quite 
surprising perfect negative relation between these two variables so that whenever 
the GDP increases, the number of disability benefits for this group of workers 
decreases and vice versa.  
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Figure 6 GDP growth and new disability benefits granted each year to individuals aged 45-59 in 
Spain, from 1980-2008. 
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Source:  GDP growth: Spanish National Institute of  Statistics,  Number of  disabil ity 
benefits granted each year to individuals aged 45-59:  Own calculations from MCVL.  
Therefore, it seems clear that, at the aggregate level, changes in the number 
of disability benefits granted to this group of pre-retirement workers and changes 
in their unemployment rate seem to respond to adjustments in the speed of 
economic growth. This relationship is also maintained if we broaden the analysis 
to include all working age individuals, as can be seen in Figure 7 and Figure 8 that 
plot both the GDP growth and the unemployment rate with the rate of new 
disability benefits to employment for all Spanish workers between 1977 and 2008. 
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Figure 7 GDP growth and rate of new disability benefits to employment (individuals of all ages) in 
Spain, from 1978-2006. 
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Figure 8 Unemployment rate and rate of new disability benefits to employment (individuals of all 
ages) in Spain, from 1987-2006. 
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Source:  Spanish National Institute of Statistics (EPA).  
Finally, if we take this aggregate data from 1977 until 2008 and perform a 
simple regression of the rate of new disability benefits to employment including as 
explanatory variables the GDP growth and yearly dummies, the results show a 
negative and significant relation between the GDP growth and the rate of new 
disability benefits to employment that remains significant when we include other 
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explanatory variables such as the unemployment rate and the GDP per capita (see 
Table 2)12.  
Consequently, this seems to suggest that workers may be strongly affected 
by business cycle conditions and that their decisions on labour market transitions 
(particularly from employment to unemployment and disability) may be affected 
by the level of economic growth13. 
 
 
              Model1     Model2     Model3      Model4 
                  
GDP Growth   -0.03960                            -0.03467   
             (-1.98)                             (-1.94)   
Year         -0.00026    -0.00010    -0.00029    0.00071   
              (-7.34)     (-0.50)     (-8.51)     (2.23)   
GDP capita               -0.00052                -0.00267   
                         (-1.02)                 (-3.05)   
Unemp. rate                         -0.00002    -0.00033   
                                     (-0.37)     (-2.91)   
Cons         0.51967     0.20599     0.57980     -1.36081   
             (7.49)      (0.56)      (8.62)      (-2.20)   
  
N            31          31          31          31   
r2           0.75423     0.72991     0.72119     0.82034   
F            42.96417    37.83363    36.21391    29.67977   
 
                                                           
12 Please note that, in this case and unlike in the regressions, the unemployment rate used is at the 
national level and it is only included to introduce more controls on the regression, as the variable of 
interest is the GDP growth. In the coming sections, we introduce in the regressions the unemployment 
rate of the region in order to capture the effect of local labour market conditions on transitions out of 
employment. 
13 These decisions on labour market transitions might be taken jointly by the employee and the 
employer or might be unilateral by one of the sides. 
Table 2 Regression results: Dependent Variable: rate of new disability benefits to employment 
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2.4 The Spanish Social Security rules for older people: 
unemployment and disability 
According to the current unemployment rules, there are two kinds of 
unemployment benefits, an unemployment insurance system (UI) for those 
workers that contributed while employed but that have been fired from the 
previous job14, and unemployment assistance (UA) for individuals who do not 
qualify for the unemployment insurance benefits. Individuals entering the UI 
scheme are entitled to receive 70% of the wages of the last job during the first six 
months and 60% after that. These quantities are subject to a minimum and a 
maximum amount. The minimum corresponds to 75% of the minimum wage and 
the maximum is not fixed and is proportional to the number of dependents in the 
household. These benefits are paid for a period of one-third of the accumulated job 
tenure and are only paid for a maximum period of two years15.The UA benefits are 
only paid to individuals with dependents and with an average family income 
below 75% of the minimum wage. There is a fixed amount paid which corresponds 
to 75% of the minimum wage. This benefit is only paid for a maximum period of 
two years16 (Bover et al., 2002). 
There is, however, an exception to this rule for people aged 52 and more. 
They can receive 75% of the minimum wage until they reach the official retirement 
age and the years spent under this scheme are counted as contributive years 
towards an old-age pension (as the public employment agency, INEM, pays the 
contributions of the unemployed)17. 
There are also two schemes of disability benefits, depending on whether the 
disability is temporary or permanent. If the disability is temporary and the risk 
covered is “common illness”, a period of 180 days of contribution to the system 
during the last 5 years is required and benefits are granted for a maximum period 
of 18 months. After that, the individual has to either return to work or enter the 
scheme of permanent disability18. No minimum contribution is required for 
disabilities resulting from “work-related accidents”.  
                                                           
14 They must have held the job for at least one year. 
15 After these two years of contributory unemployment benefits, unemployed individuals who are still 
not working can have access to social assistance benefits.  
16 There is also a special scheme in Andalucía and Extremadura for agricultural workers who have been 
employed for 40 days during the year. They are entitled to receive 75% of the minimum wage for 90 to 
300 days each year. The number of days depends on their age and number of dependents. 
17 This rule was introduced in 1989. 
18 Provided on passing a medical examination that determines the “permanent disability” condition. 
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For permanent disability situations, three levels of disability are identified 
which depend on the severity of the injury/illness and which involve different 
eligibility requirements and pension amounts. Included in the first level (inability 
to perform the usual job), there is a special provision for which workers with few 
qualifications from disadvantaged socio-economic circumstances who are older 
than 55 years19 are eligible to receive a higher amount of disability benefits (75% of 
the regulatory base as opposed to 55%, which is the regular amount paid by this 
type of disability benefits).  
Between 5 and 15 years of contribution are required when the source of the 
disability is an ordinary illness and the benefit base is calculated in a similar way 
as old-age benefits20. No contributive requirement is needed if the disability is 
caused by a work related or unrelated accident or by a professional illness. In the 
case of a work-related accident or professional illness, the benefit base corresponds 
to the average wage in the last year of work and for a work-unrelated accident the 
benefit is calculated as the average annual wage for a 24 month-period that the 
individual can choose from the last seven years of work. All three schemes are 
automatically converted to old-age benefits when the individual turns 65 (Jimenez-
Martin et al., 2006). 
2.5 Modelling framework: The hazard regression model 
The analysis is divided into two stages. In the first one, we estimate a single 
exit logistic hazard model to study transitions from employment to non-
employment with a particular focus on the duration of employment spells. In the 
second part of the paper, a competing risk model is estimated in order to 
distinguish between the various routes out of employment: disability benefits, 
unemployment or inactivity. The idea of fitting these two different models is to 
first analyze the overall impact of BC conditions on exits from employment before 
going into more detail about the effect of the BC for each of the different available 
routes of doing these transitions.  
2.5.1 Single exit logistic hazard model 
We apply the logistic model to analyze single exit transitions from 
employment to non-employment for Spanish workers aged 45-59. We have chosen 
this discrete time model because our data is recorded in monthly intervals and, as 
we are dealing with employment contracts, exits are usually observed at the 
                                                           
19 The argument behind this special arrangement is the fact that this group of workers is considered to 
be in a particularly difficult position for finding a new job. 
20 The way in which the regulatory base is calculated is explained in detail in chapter 4. 
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beginning, the middle or the end of the interval. Therefore, the logistic model 
seemed more appropriate than the complementary log-log model (which is the 
discrete time representation of a continuous time hazard model). However, a 
number of tests conducted with the cloglog model provide very similar results to 
our logistic results so that, for our analysis, both models could be used. 
The logistic hazard model estimates the probability that an individual will 
leave employment at time t given the fact that he has been employed for, at least, t 
periods (where t is the discrete time duration variable).  
We observe a person’s spell until the end of the t month, at which point we 
observe that the spell is either complete or right censored. Therefore, for each 
individual in our sample, the probability of a spell being completed at time t given 
that it has continued, at least, until time t takes the form of: 
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(Equation 1) 
Where,  
))(),(,( tztxth iii  is the discrete time hazard rate for month t conditional on a 
vector of exogenous variables; )(txi describing personal characteristics of the 
individual such as age or education level and  )(tzi   which include the variables 
that describe the economic situation of the sector and the region in which the 
individual works. )(tiθ are the variables that represent duration dependence and 
depend on the number of months spent in employment. For the purposes of this 
paper, we characterize duration dependence as a cubic polynomial function of 
time:  
3
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(Equation 2) 
Where 1θ  , 2θ  and 3θ  are the shape parameters, which are estimated together 
with the slope parameters and the constant. 
Therefore, the likelihood contribution of a censored spell is given by: 
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Whereas the contribution to the likelihood function of a complete spell is: 
 
 
 
And the log-likelihood function for the sample as a whole is represented by: 
 
 
 
Where ci is the censoring indicator: 
 
 
If we define Yti as a (0,1) variable that is 1 when the observed duration equals t:        
)(1 tTY iti ==  
(Equation 6) 
Then, the log-likelihood function of the sample for Yti takes the same form as the 
likelihood function of a standard binary dependent variable model (Jenkins, 1995): 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, the model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood where the hazard rate )(thi  
corresponds to a logit probability; estimation is the same as estimating a sequence 
of logit models defined on the surviving population at each duration, where the 
dependent variable equals 1 whenever an exit from employment is observed and 0 
otherwise.  
2.5.2 Competing risk model 
We further consider the possibility of exit from employment to one of the 
three following destination states: unemployment; disability benefits and 
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inactivity. With the assumption of independence of the destination-specific hazard 
rates21, the discrete hazard rate for exit at time t to any of the three destinations is 
simply the sum of the destination-specific discrete hazard rates, ( )uh t , ( )ih t  and 
( )dh t : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )u i dh t h t h t h t= + +  
 
(Equation 8) 
 
where 
( )uh t  is the hazard rate of experiencing a transition from employment to 
unemployment 
( )ih t  is the hazard rate of a transition to inactivity and,  
( )dh t  is the hazard rate to disability benefits. 
The discrete time hazard into one of the m states is equal to the probability of 
making a transition in interval t, conditional upon surviving up to the beginning of 
the interval.  
We assume a specific form for the conditional destination-specific hazard 
rate mith for individual i to destination m in interval t such that22: 
  
                                                                                                
 
 
Where, as before, itX is a vector of personal characteristics, Zit include the 
variables that describe the economic situation of the sector and the region in which 
the individual works and mtθ is the baseline hazard function which is modelled as a 
cubic polynomial.  
                                                           
21 The assumption of independence may be questionable in the context of our analysis but it is still 
reasonable. 
22 We assume that the conditional destination-specific hazard rate is independent from the other 
competing risks and can be derived from a latent variable model in which the error term has a standard 
logistic distribution 
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For the given hazard rate described above, the individual worker’s 
likelihood contribution has the same form as the likelihood of a standard 
multinomial logit model (Allison, 1982). 
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(Equation 10) 
where mitc  is a destination-specific censoring indicator which equals 1 if worker i 
exits to state m in interval t, and 0ith  is the conditional probability of making no 
transition (reference category).  
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2.6 Data  
The study will use the Continuous Sample of Working Lives (Muestra 
Continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL) which is a microeconomic data set based on 
administrative records compiled from three sources; the Spanish Social Security 
Administration, the Tax Office and the National Census. There have been four 
waves until now, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 and it is envisaged that the 
information will be updated annually. We have used the 2007 wave. It contains a 
random sample of 4% of all the individuals who, at some point during 2007, had 
contributed towards the social security system (either by working or being in an 
unemployment scheme) or had received a contributory pension. The random 
sample selected contains over one million people. 
There is information available on the entire employment history of the 
workers, including the exact duration of employment, unemployment and pension 
spells, and for each spell, the firm’s sector and region of activity, the type of 
contract held, the wages measured as contribution bases, the level of pension and 
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unemployment benefits, among others. There is also some information on personal 
characteristics such as age, gender, nationality and level of education. 
The macroeconomic variables used to capture the economic business cycle 
are constructed with information derived from the Spanish Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica. 
We measure growth and employability performance of different economic sectors 
and regions in Spain to capture the variation in the business cycle between times, 
sectors and regions. 
2.6.1 Sample selection criteria and variables 
We select employment spells of individuals in the sample between 45 and 
5923 years old and we follow them until their first exit from employment or until 
they are censored (last month of age 59 or 2006), whichever occurs earlier. We 
don’t consider spells of individuals who are unemployed, inactive or receiving 
disability benefits, as our focus is on transitions out of employment. The analysis is 
conducted separately for women and men.  
There is a maximum of 180 periods of time (15 years*12months) for each 
individual and the sample selected contains 26.556 women, of which 9.451 leave 
the labour market (5.163 to unemployment, 653 to disability, 3.635 to inactivity) 
and 58.684 men, of which 24.883 leave the labour market (14.549 to unemployment, 
1.814 to disability, 8.520 to inactivity). We also used a variant of this sample in 
which we applied the same sample selection criteria laid out above with the extra 
requirement that the individuals selected need to have been continuously working 
for the two years prior to entering the sample. With this restriction we exclude 
from our sample individuals with short temporary contracts (which can be signed 
for one to three years) and with a more unstable job situation who probably have a 
different labour market behaviour than workers with longer term contracts. At the 
same time, we want to test whether these workers are affected in a different way 
by the business cycle.  
                                                           
23 We don’t include individuals aged 60 because, at that age, they can already access some early 
retirement schemes and this would constitute another possible exit route which is not the focus of our 
paper. 
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2.6.2 Explanatory Variables 
First, we have included three variables that capture duration dependence. 
The baseline hazard is modelled as a cubic polynomial function of duration. The 
level of education obtained is incorporated with three dummies: The first one 
captures individuals who cannot read or write or who dropped out of education 
before finishing high school. The second one includes individuals holding a high 
school diploma (or equivalent) whereas the third one is for people with a 
bachelor’s degree and other higher education. Regional and cohort dummies are 
also included as regressors as well as dummies for ages 52, 55 and 58 to capture the 
effect of the special unemployment and disability schemes available at these ages 
on transitions out of employment. The dummy variable at age 58 is introduced in 
order to capture the effect of individuals who have contributed for enough years to 
receive two years of unemployment benefits at the age of 58 before joining the 
early retirement scheme when they turn 60. The dummy at age 52 is introduced to 
capture the special scheme in unemployment benefits whereas the dummy at age 
55 captures the increase from 55% to 75% in disability benefits available at this age. 
Both of these schemes are explained in detail in section 2.4 above. 
There are six dummy variables that represent the economic activity of the 
firm in which the individual is working, one for each sector of activity (primary, 
secondary and tertiary sectors, public administration, education and social 
services). There is also a variable that describes the number of workers in the firm 
and three dummy variables that account for partial/full time employment, 
temporary(short-term)/permanent contract of employment and 
voluntary/involuntary termination of the contract24.  Two more variables describe 
the employment history of the worker. The first one captures the number of years 
that the individual worked from age 15 until the last month of age 44. The second 
one represents the tenure of the worker and is calculated as the number of years 
spent working in the employment spell with which the individual enters the 
sample. 
Monetary variables: 
The variable that we include in order to capture the monetary incentives of 
the worker is the contributions to the social security administration, which is a 
double censored (from below and above) version of the wages (see Boldrin et al., 
2004, for a procedure to recover wages from contributions). We have information 
                                                           
24 Partial Contract: A dummy variable which is 1 if the contract of employment is a part-time contract. 
Temporary Contract: Is a dummy variable constructed from a variable describing the type of contract 
and equals 0 if the contract is temporary or short-term and 1 if the contract is permanent. 
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about this variable for each month that the individual is contributing to the Social 
Security Administration. 
Macroeconomic variables: 
In order to capture the macroeconomic conditions at each point in time, we 
use three macroeconomic variables derived from the Spanish National Institute of 
Statistics. The first variable represents the unemployment rate of each of the 18 
autonomous communities in Spain and we assign this value to each individual 
according to the autonomous community in which they work. Depending on the 
economic sector in which the individual is reported to work, we also assign them 
the value of two variables that capture both the unemployment rate and the 
average number of hours worked in each of the 17 economic sectors in which the 
National Institute of Statistics divides the Spanish economy. These macroeconomic 
variables vary over time. We also include an interaction term of these variables 
with the logarithm of duration. Finally, we include the GDP growth at the national 
level in order to capture national business cycle trends that are not captured by the 
regional or sector variables25. 
2.7 Results  
2.7.1 Non-parametric analysis 
If we take a look at the empirical hazard rates derived from our sample, we 
can already see the strong impact on the hazard rate of some of the explanatory 
variables included in the analysis. The empirical hazard for a given number of 
months is calculated as the total number of exits from employment in each month 
divided by the population in employment at the beginning of that month. This 
summarizes the sample probability of leaving employment at each particular point 
in time. However, for simplicity purposes, we present this information compiled 
by age instead of months.  
Figure 9 and Figure 10, show the interval hazard rates for men and women 
respectively. Both figures show three peaks of the hazard rate at ages 52, 55 and 58, 
which could be attributable to the special schemes on the unemployment and 
disability benefits legislation. However, in the case of women, the effect at age 58 is 
considerably stronger than the two effects at ages 52 and 55 which are 
approximately of the same size. For Spanish men, the increase in the hazard rate is 
more progressive and higher at each of the three age intervals. 
                                                           
25 Apart from these variables, we have also done some tests with regional employment rates, regional 
employment growth and the employment rate of the sector. Results don’t differ that much and we 
found it more interesting in terms of interpreting the results to use unemployment rates. 
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Figure 9 Interval hazard rate men aged 45-59 in Spain. 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Interval hazard rate women 45-59 in Spain. 
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Figure 11 Interval hazard rate by temporary/permanent contract of employment, men aged 45-59 in 
Spain. 
 
 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 plot the empirical hazard rates according to 
temporary/permanent contract and it becomes clear that it is workers with a 
temporary contract (men and women) the ones leaving employment between ages 
45 and 59. 
Individuals with a permanent contract tend to leave less the labour force 
before reaching the retirement age. This tendency for temporary workers to leave 
the labour market could be interpreted as a means of escaping from a very 
uncertain and unstable job situation, as it is probably very difficult for these older 
workers to find a job once their temporary contract expires.  
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Figure 12 Interval hazard rate by temporary/permanent contract of employment, women aged 45-59 
in Spain. 
 
 
In fact, as stressed above, the special unemployment and disability 
schemes at ages 52 and 55 were already introduced in an attempt to provide a 
minimum degree of income stability for older workers who are unable to find a job 
after being fired due to industrial relocation or modernization plans. However, 
there is another possible interpretation; the choice to work under a temporary 
contract might already be a lifestyle choice indicating increased preference for 
leisure time.  Unfortunately, we don’t have information on preferences or the 
difficulties of these workers to find a new job. 
Finally, Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the hazard rates for men and women 
with different educational levels. For women, the hazard rate clearly decreases 
according to the level of education and the peak at age 58 is higher for those with a 
level of education below a bachelor degree. For men, there is not much difference 
in the hazard rates for individuals with or without a high-school diploma although 
hazard rates for those with bachelor’s degrees are slightly lower. 
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Figure 13 Interval hazard rate by level of education, men aged 45-59 in Spain. 
 
 
 
Figure 14 Interval hazard rate by level of education, women aged 45-59 in Spain. 
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2.7.2 Results: Hazard Regression analysis 
In this section we estimate the effect of personal and job-related 
characteristics, business cycle and age dummy variables on the hazard of leaving 
employment, while controlling for duration dependence through a cubic 
polynomial function of time. 
The results are shown in Table 3, Table 5 and Table 6 for the case of men and 
Table 4, Table 7 and Table 8 for women. 
We have estimated two models for each gender, a logistic hazard regression 
model for single exit from employment to a non-employment situation and a 
competing risk model to assess the differences between exits from employment to 
either unemployment, disability benefits or inactivity.  As a result of the non-
linearity of the model estimated and the inclusion of interaction terms in the 
regression, we only discuss the results of the regressions in terms of sign and 
statistical significance of the coefficients of the explanatory variables. The size of 
these effects is discussed in the subsequent section through calibration of the 
effects of changes in selected variables on the predicted hazard rates. 
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                                    Coefficients              
 
Contributions SS                              -.0027228***   
Contributions SS * (log dur)                   .0002589***   
High School                                    -.288038***   
Bachelor's and Higher                         -1.333674***   
Bachelor's and Higher * (log dur)              .0635003*     
Number Workers Firm                            .0003305***   
Catalonia Region                               .5101453***   
Mediterranean Region                           .2057207**    
Northern Region (excl Catalonia)                1.97327***   
Castilla: Centre (excl Madrid)                 1.746574***   
South Region                                    1.14097***   
duration                                      -.0362429***   
duration1                                      .0004224***   
duration2                                     -1.19e-06***   
Voluntary Termination Empl                     1.493615***   
Sector empl: Primary Sector                    -3.71105***   
Sector empl: Secondary Sector                 -3.468923***   
Sector empl: Tertiary Sector                  -3.508407***   
Sector empl: Education                        -4.148343***   
Sector empl: Social Services                  -5.449722***   
Part-time Contract                            -2.324987***   
Number Years Contributed 15-45                 .0330285***   
Tenure                                        -.0100746***   
Temporary Contract                             3.698862***   
Temporary Contract * (log dur)                -.4062714***   
Cohort born in 1941-1946                      .7321382***   
Cohort born in 1947-1951                       1.18961***   
Cohort born in 1952-1956                       1.64788***   
Cohort born in 1957-1961                      2.174096***   
Unem Rate CCAA                                 .0264608***   
(Unem Rate CCAA)*(log dur)                    -.0034779      
Unem Rate Sector                              -.2677416***   
(Unem Rate Sector)*(log dur)                    .032374***   
Av Hours Worked Sector                        -.0455558*     
(Av Hours Worked)*(log dur)                    .0126749***   
GDP growth                                    -.2728114***   
age52                                          .4501008***   
age55                                          .2571083*     
age58                                          .7658007***   
Constant                                      -4.986807***   
 
 
N                                               3302709                
ll                                             -26165.35                
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Table 3 Determinants of the probability of leaving employment, Spanish male aged 45-59 (logistic 
hazard regression model)  
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                                               Coefficients      
 
Contributions SS                              -.0033717***   
Contributions SS * (log dur)                    .000273***   
High School                                   -.4455875***   
Bachelor's and Higher                         -1.528574***   
Bachelor's and Higher * (log dur)              .0975434*     
Number Workers Firm                            .0003608***   
Catalonia Region                                1.21007***   
Mediterranean Region                          -.0833553      
Northern Region (excl Catalonia)               2.148691***   
Castilla: Centre (excl Madrid)                 1.944586***   
South Region                                   1.490959***   
duration                                      -.0583406***   
duration1                                      .0007447***   
duration2                                     -2.38e-06***   
Voluntary Termination Empl                     1.549265***   
Sector empl: Primary Sector                   -3.102886**    
Sector empl: Secondary Sector                 -2.312497***   
Sector empl: Tertiary Sector                  -2.724112***   
Sector empl: Education                        -2.312423***   
Sector empl: Social Services                  -4.146849***   
Part-time Contract                            -2.814936***   
Number Years Contributed 15-45                 -.037407***   
Tenure                                         .0192176***   
Temporary Contract                             3.510437***   
Temporary Contract * (log dur)                -.4075445***   
Cohort born in 1941-1946                      .9632839***   
Cohort born in 1947-1951                      1.678875***   
Cohort born in 1952-1956                      2.418431***   
Cohort born in 1957-1961                      3.186847***   
Unem Rate CCAA                                 .0062434      
(Unem Rate CCAA)*(log dur)                    -.0050866      
Unem Rate Sector                              -.4780831***   
(Unem Rate Sector)*(log dur)                   .1041583***   
Av Hours Worked Sector                        -.0730138*     
(Av Hours Worked)*(log dur)                    .0068292      
GDP growth                                    -.1328065***   
age52                                          .5298079**    
age55                                          .194174      
age58                                          .1803018      
Constant                                      -3.380862*     
 
N                                               1215877                
ll                                             -8594.184                
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Determinants of the probability of leaving employment, Spanish female aged 45-59 
(logistic hazard regression model) 
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2.7.2.1 Duration dependence 
We have modelled the baseline hazard as a cubic polynomial function of 
duration because, together with the age dummies, this specification reproduces the 
shape of the empirical interval hazard rate reasonably closely.  
We have also tried to estimate the model with a piece-wise constant 
specification of the baseline hazard in order to allow for greater flexibility as we 
don’t have to assume any functional form for the baseline hazard. However, in the 
competing risk case, when duration was represented by time dummies (one for 
each month), several of these dummy variables were not identified as for certain 
months there was no exit observed to one of the exit routes26. Furthermore, in this 
specification, age dummies could not be included as they caused multicollinearity 
problems with the duration variables. On the other hand, if we increase the 
number of months included in each dummy variable to reduce the number of these 
variables and allow for a better identification of the model, we are unable to 
capture age effects. 
In order to keep consistency between the two specifications that we use 
(logistic and competing risk models) and to be able to test the effects of some 
unemployment and disability schemes through age dummies, we decided to 
represent duration dependence with a cubic polynomial function of time. 
In addition, the coefficients of the explanatory variables are very similar in 
the model in which duration dependence is modelled as a piece-wise constant and 
the model with a cubic polynomial baseline hazard so that the results that we 
report correspond to the model with the cubic polynomial baseline hazard. 
2.7.2.2 Individual features and employer, firm and 
industry characteristics  
Our findings confirm that the effect of personal characteristics is similar to 
what the literature on the topic suggests. Individuals with higher education and 
individuals with a part-time contract show lower hazard rates. Therefore, the idea 
of introducing partial retirement schemes in order to keep older workers active in 
the labour market would seem like a positive alternative as part-time workers 
leave employment less than full-time workers. On the other hand, temporary 
contracts are not a good policy to retain workers in employment, as the hazard rate 
increases substantially for individuals with a temporary contract. This result 
                                                           
26 The same problem occurred if we grouped the time dummies in small groups of 3 or 4 months for 
each time dummy representing duration. 
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implies that temporary contracts usually run out without leading to a permanent 
contract so that temporary contracts in Spain are not used as stepping-stones to 
reach a more stable employment situation.  
In terms of regions, Madrid has the lowest hazard rate, followed by the 
Mediterranean region, Catalonia, Southern Spain and the Centre (Castilla), while 
the Northern region has the highest hazard rate.  
Social security contributions (our proxy for wages) show a negative sign so 
that employees with higher salaries have a lower hazard rate as the monetary 
incentives to stay employed are stronger compared to receiving unemployment or 
disability benefits. This effect increases with elapsed duration. 
The coefficient for the number of years contributed between ages 15 and 45 is 
positive and significant suggesting that individuals who have been contributing 
for a longer period to the social security administration have a higher hazard to 
leave the labour force possibly because they fulfil the contributory eligibility 
conditions to receive unemployment or disability benefits. On the other hand, 
individuals who have been working for longer in the current job at the time of 
entering the sample have a lower hazard rate, which could be interpreted as 
having a stronger attachment to the employer the longer you work for the same 
firm. 
2.7.2.3 Business cycle conditions and age effects 
Business cycle effects are measured in terms of the unemployment rate of the 
autonomous community in which the individual is working, the unemployment 
rate of that firm’s sector of activity, the average number of hours worked in the 
sector of activity and, finally, the GDP growth rate to capture national business 
cycle trends that are not captured by the regional or sector variables.  
The first variable, the unemployment rate of the autonomous community 
shows the anticipated positive sign for both males and females, but it is stronger 
and more significant in the case of men. The negative sign of the interaction term 
with duration suggests that the effect of the unemployment rate is lower for 
individuals who remain employed for a longer period of time.  
However, the coefficient of the unemployment rate of the sector of activity of 
the firm has a negative sign, which is unexpected and is very significant for both 
genders while the interaction term displays a positive and significant sign. A 
possible interpretation of this result is the idea that the negative consequences (in 
terms of increased unemployment) of idiosyncratic shocks that affect only one 
sector of the economy can be absorbed by other sectors of the economy that might 
be experiencing a growth path. Therefore, this fact points to the existence of 
opportunities for workers to move to other sectors of the economy when 
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unemployment in the sector of activity is high compared to overall unemployment 
in other sectors.  
The higher the number of hours worked in the sector, the lower the hazard 
rate of leaving employment and this effect is stronger for individuals who have 
been employed for longer.  
The GDP growth rate has the expected negative (and very significant) sign 
reinforcing the idea that workers tend to leave employment at times when the 
economy is at its lowest rate of growth.  
For men, the three age peaks at 52, 55 and 58 have a higher and very 
significant hazard rate whereas for the case of women only the 52 variable turns 
out to be significant. However, all of them have a positive coefficient. 
The results of the competing risk model present a very interesting finding for 
the disability option. If we take a look at Table 5, the coefficient for the 
unemployment rate of the autonomous community is positive and significant and 
the GDP growth coefficient is negative and also very significant suggesting that 
exit to disability is very much influenced by the economic cycle of both the region 
and the country as a whole. The medical requirements needed to access this route 
are not as strict as to prevent workers from using this route as an alternative to 
claiming unemployment benefits during bad economic times. In this case, a higher 
sector unemployment rate is also reflected in an increased hazard rate of leaving 
employment to receive disability benefits. 
We have also estimated the same competing risk model using the sample of 
people observed as working continuously for the two years prior to entering the 
sample. The aim is to test whether the results are any different for workers with a 
more stable job situation (as we exclude workers with very short-term contracts).  
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                                    Disability     Unemployment    Inactivity    
                                   
 
Contributions SS                     -0.00203***    -0.00305***    -0.00298*** 
(Contribution SS)*(log dur)           0.00006        0.00036***     0.00001    
High School                           0.06564       -0.19058***     0.22083    
Bachelor's and Higher                 0.20879       -1.60031***     0.78750*   
(Bachelors's and Higher)*(log dur)   -0.05496        0.06682*      -0.09064    
Number Workers Firm                   0.00008***     0.00046***    -0.00013**  
Catalonia Region                      0.25374*       2.12555***    -0.46312**  
Mediterranean Region                  0.23144       -0.23275**     -0.67753*** 
Northern Region (excl Catalonia)      0.59395***     4.09505***    -0.35994*   
Castilla: Centre (excl Madrid)        0.28579*       3.99653***    -0.56086**  
South Region                          0.81876***     2.27052***    -0.58518**  
duration                             -0.03112       -0.05939***    -0.05650**  
duration1                             0.00032*       0.00062***     0.00067**  
duration2                            -0.00000       -0.00000***    -0.00000**  
Voluntary Termination Empl           -1.51588***     2.12595***     0.36774**  
Part-time Contract                   -1.13919***    -5.60529***    -0.61262*   
Number Years Contributed 15-45        0.01558*      -0.01048***    -0.02436*   
Tenure                                0.00401       -0.01632***     0.01130    
Cohort born in 1941-1946              0.68599***     0.36473***     0.90093*** 
Cohort born in 1947-1951              1.19878***     0.75943***     1.24030*** 
Cohort born in 1952-1956              1.43072***     1.26949***     0.97528*** 
Cohort born in 1957-1961              1.94947***     1.96465***    -0.09233    
Unem Rate CCAA                        0.06457*       0.08015***    -0.01746    
(Unem Rate CCAA)*(log dur)           -0.01449*      -0.01557***     0.01308    
Unem Rate Sector                      0.05904       -0.46275***    -0.01514    
(Unem Rate Sector)*(log dur)         -0.01002        0.00496        0.00039    
Av Hours Worked Sector               -0.08587*      -0.21426***    -0.00104    
(Av Hours Worked)*(log dur)           0.03097***     0.00877***     0.00647    
GDP growth                           -0.08667***    -0.34260***    -0.05652*   
age52                                -0.35493        0.61324***     0.09696    
age55                                 0.08273        0.39656***    -0.41544    
age58                                 0.39408        0.98238***     0.60168    
Constant                             -8.58850***     2.21552***    -6.42835*** 
 
N                                     3302709                                                     
ll                                   -36164.43                                                    
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
                                    Disability     Unemployment     Inactivity    
                                   
Unem Rate CCAA                       0.02547        0.05662***      -0.05389    
(Unem Rate CCAA)*(log dur)          -0.00537       -0.01091***       0.02868**  
Unem Rate Sector                     0.13678**     -0.46747***      -0.05693    
(Unem Rate Sector)*(log dur)        -0.03113**      0.01013          0.00958    
Av Hours Worked Sector              -0.08597*      -0.22578***       0.05960    
(Av Hours Worked)*(log dur)          0.03204***     0.00491*        -0.00411    
GDP growth                          -0.07817***    -0.39401***      -0.03106    
 
N                                   2986084                                  
ll                                 -29486.682                                  
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 5 Determinants of the probability of going to disability benefits, unemployment 
and inactivity Spanish male aged 45-59 (competing-risk hazard regression model). 
Table 6 Business cycle coefficients, Spanish male 45-59 conditional on working for two 
years before entering the sample (competing risk hazard regression model) 
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                                     Disability     Unemployment    Inactivity    
                                   
 
Contributions SS                      -0.00214***    -0.00417***    -0.00426*** 
(Contribution SS)*(log dur)            0.00003        0.00050***     0.00015    
High School                           -0.15942       -0.53211***     0.08196    
Bachelor's and Higher                 -0.39680       -1.60398***     0.08995    
(Bachelors's and Higher)*(log dur)     0.10779        0.05362        0.06782    
Number Workers Firm                    0.00006**      0.00049***     0.00001    
Catalonia Region                       0.16061        2.69987***    -0.54284*   
Mediterranean Region                   0.13876       -0.23809       -0.76888*   
Northern Region (excl Catalonia)       0.51579**      4.13433***    -0.95251**  
Castilla: Centre (excl Madrid)         0.05444        3.89641***    -0.15090    
South Region                           0.94122***     1.78955***    -1.01541**  
duration                              -0.03212       -0.11759***     0.00925    
duration1                              0.00029        0.00129***     0.00016    
duration2                             -0.00000       -0.00000***    -0.00000    
Voluntary Termination Empl            -1.60678**      2.26171***     0.02614    
Part-time Contract                    -1.72939***    -7.17703***    -0.95575*** 
Number Years Contributed 15-45         0.01821       -0.07915***     0.00044    
Tenure                                -0.00947        0.00055       -0.00219    
Cohort born in 1941-1946               0.66024**      0.68751***     0.28962    
Cohort born in 1947-1951               1.16505***     1.45295***     0.19621    
Cohort born in 1952-1956               1.29205***     2.22800***     0.27253    
Cohort born in 1957-1961               0.97322        3.10912***    -0.60145    
Unem Rate CCAA                        -0.10062        0.04539***     0.03042    
(Unem Rate CCAA)*(log dur)             0.01740       -0.02222***     0.01198    
Unem Rate Sector                      -0.09578       -0.62136***    -0.08130    
(Unem Rate Sector)*(log dur)           0.02280        0.05250***     0.02335    
Av Hours Worked Sector                -0.04407       -0.08528***     0.04072    
(Av Hours Worked)*(log dur)            0.01204        0.01249***    -0.01588    
GDP growth                            -0.16146***    -0.13096***    -0.01816    
age52                                 -1.51549        0.80914***     0.06362    
age55                                  0.80955*      -0.12329       -0.21635    
age58                                 -0.26143        0.71663*     -28.02658    
Constant                              -5.94766***    -2.20807***    -6.98773*** 
 
N                                      1215877                                
ll                                    -11330.2                                
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
                             
                        Disability     Unemployment    Inactivity    
                                   
 
Unem Rate CCAA                       -0.08366        0.10781***     0.05129    
(Unem Rate CCAA)*(log dur)            0.01733       -0.03371***     0.00886    
Unem Rate Sector                     -0.03119       -0.56614***     0.07138    
(Unem Rate Sector)*(log dur)          0.00032        0.03890*      -0.03381    
Av Hours Worked Sector               -0.05555       -0.11256***    -0.11459    
(Av Hours Worked)*(log dur)           0.01893        0.01739***     0.01211    
GDP growth                           -0.15665***    -0.21273***    -0.02763    
 
N                                     1069059                                  
ll                                   -7685.83                                  
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Table 8 Business cycle coefficients, Spanish female 45-59 conditional on working for two years 
before entering the sample (competing risk hazard regression model) 
Table 7 Determinants of the probability of going to disability benefits, unemployment and 
inactivity, Spanish female aged 45-59 (competing risk hazard regression model) 
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The results of this estimation are shown in Table 6 and Table 8. The sign of 
the coefficients do not change with respect to the original sample but the sector 
unemployment rate has now a stronger effect on hazard rates than the 
unemployment rate of the autonomous community and the GDP growth. 
Therefore, a deterioration of the economic conditions in a particular economic 
sector increases the hazard rate of making a transition to disability benefits for 
individuals employed in that sector. As a result, individuals with a more stable 
employment situation are more affected by the economic situation of the sector of 
activity and by the economy-wide business cycle conditions than by the economic 
situation of the autonomous community in which they work. 
2.7.3 Effects on hazard rates 
We finish by analyzing the relative size of the effects outlined in the previous 
section. Of all the variables, we have chosen to concentrate on the macroeconomic 
variables, as they are the main focus of this chapter, and on the variable that 
describes the type of temporary/permanent contract, so as to illustrate the size of 
the differences on the hazard rates of these two groups of workers. Comparisons of 
size are complicated as they depend on the reference group of individuals and the 
values chosen for the evaluation. In Figure 15 we compare the predicted hazard 
rates of a representative individual27 with either a temporary or a permanent 
contract of employment. For that comparison, we keep macroeconomic variables at 
their sample means: 15.75% unemployment rate for the autonomous community; 
6.84% unemployment rate for the sector of activity; 40.31 average number of hours 
worked and 2.96% GDP growth.   
According to our predictions, a person in our sample has a 1.3 percentage 
point higher hazard rate of leaving employment if he has a temporary contract of 
employment than if he has a permanent contract. 
                                                           
27 The representative individual has the values of the reference category of the regressions for the 
explanatory variables that are dummies and the mean values of the sample for the other explanatory 
variables such as contributions (wages), number of workers in the firm, etc…  
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Figure 15 Predicted hazard rate men 45-59 by temporary/permanent contract of employment 
0
.
00
5
.
01
.
01
5
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 108 120 132 144 156 168 180
time
Temporary contract Permanent contract
hazard rates sample mean values: Men 45-59
 
Figure 16 Predicted hazard rate men 45-59 by maximum/minimum level of GDP growth. 
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Figure 16 shows that when GDP growth is at the lowest point of our sample 
period (-1.8%) the hazard of a 58 year-old men leaving employment is 4 percentage 
points higher than at times of maximum GDP growth (6.7%). For a 59 year-old men 
the difference is of 2 percentage points. 
The effect of changing the unemployment rate to the maximum and 
minimum value of the sample period is not as strong as the effect of the GDP 
growth but it is still important: for a 58 year-old men the hazard rate is 1 
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percentage point higher when the unemployment rate is at its maximum (34.9%) 
than when it is at its minimum rate (3.47%) (Figure 17). 
Figure 17 Predicted hazard rate men 45-59 by maximum/minimum level of unemployment rates 
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2.8 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we have investigated the effect of business cycle conditions in 
Spain on labour market transitions from employment to disability benefits, 
unemployment and inactivity for men and women aged 45-59.  
We have also described two special schemes in the unemployment and 
disability legislation which induce people to make the transitions when they reach 
a certain age. 
For this analysis, we have estimated two kinds of duration models, a logistic 
hazard model for single exit transitions from employment to all the other non-
employment situations and a competing risk model for transitions from 
employment to each of the other three states: unemployment, disability and 
inactivity.  
We have used two databases for our analysis: on the one hand, the so-called 
“Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales”, which is an administrative database, 
obtained from a random draw of the Spanish Social Security records and, on the 
other hand, from the Spanish National Institute of Statistics we have derived the 
macroeconomic information on the business cycle conditions. 
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Our main findings can be listed as following: 
• Business cycle conditions are found to affect not only transitions from 
employment to unemployment, but also transitions from employment to 
disability. This effect holds both for men and women. Individuals are more 
likely to leave employment to receive disability benefits when the 
economic situation of the country is less favourable. Disability benefits are 
being used as an alternative means of leaving the labour market for 
individuals who find it difficult to get a new job (because of age) and who 
(most probably) do not fulfil the requirements to receive unemployment 
benefits.   
• For exits to disability benefits, the effect of the economic environment in 
the sector of activity proves to be stronger than the effect of the economic 
environment in the region. However, the opposite can be said for the 
unemployment option, as a higher unemployment rate in the sector of 
activity in which the individual is working reduces the hazard of leaving 
employment to receive unemployment benefits. Furthermore, this effect is 
stronger than the effect of the unemployment rate of the autonomous 
community.  
• The special schemes in the unemployment and disability legislation 
mentioned in this paper that relax the conditions to access these benefits at 
ages 52, 55 and 58, trigger specific age effects in transitions, particularly so 
for exits to unemployment. 
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2.9 Appendix: Tables and Figures 
Figure 18 Interval hazard rate exit to Unemployment; men & women 45-59 
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Figure 19 Interval hazard rate exit to Disability; men & women 45-59 
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Figure 20 Interval hazard rate exit to Inactivity; men & women 45-59 
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      Table 9 Means and standard deviations. Sample of men 45-59 
                     
                                             mean             sd 
 
 
Contributions SS                           1510.265        674.6356 
Contributions SS * (log dur)               5793.033        3263.335 
High School                               .2909938        .4542208 
Bachelor's and Higher                      .3222576        .4673411 
Bachelor's and Higher * (log dur)          1.193649        1.836985 
Number Workers Firm                        866.6959        3829.889 
Catalonia Region                           .2218119        .4154653 
Mediterranean Region                       .1146653        .3186176 
Northern Region (excl Catalon)             .2068248        .4050288 
Castilla: Centre (excl Madrid)             .1272828        .3332895 
South Region                               .1506106         .357669 
duration                                   64.41215        46.51883 
duration1                                  6312.927         7543.53 
duration2                                  742651.2         1185394 
Voluntary Termination Empl                 .0695484        .2543844 
Sector empl: Primary Sector                .0120259        .1090012 
Sector empl: Secondary Sector              .4632791        .4986498 
Sector empl: Tertiary Sector               .3535964        .4780858 
Sector empl: Education                     .0195552        .1384657 
Sector empl: Social Services               .0675391        .2509534 
Part-time Contract                         .0299512        .1704527 
Number Years Contributed 15-45             14.58961        6.203472 
Tenure                                     8.450237        7.114126 
Temporary Contract                         .4736366        .4993046 
Temporary Contract * (log dur)             1.756559        2.004741 
Cohort born in 1941-1946                   .3314358        .4707294 
Cohort born in 1947-1951                   .2714572        .4447114 
Cohort born in 1952-1956                   .1925386        .3942937 
Cohort born in 1957-1961                   .0452426        .2078357 
Unem Rate CCAA                             15.75695        6.314089 
(Unem Rate CCAA)*(log dur)                 58.94927        29.52057 
Unem Rate Sector                           6.845021        4.145969 
(Unem Rate Sector)*(log dur)               25.75916        17.90896 
Av Hours Worked Sector                     40.31725        2.020348 
(Av Hours Worked)*(log dur)                151.5127         44.2845 
GDP growth                                 2.969093        1.474075 
age52                                      .0169558        .1291057 
age55                                      .0112629        .1055274 
age58                                      .0064744        .0802027 
 
N                                           3302709              
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Table 10 Means and standard deviations. Sample of women 45-59 
 
                                                 mean              sd 
 
Contributions SS                                1337.592        665.8197 
Contributions SS * (log dur)                    4889.283        3013.761 
High School                                     .3118268        .4632397 
Bachelor's and Higher                           .4017133        .4902448 
Bachelor's and Higher * (log dur)                1.42292        1.875155 
Number Workers Firm                             1160.565        4109.105 
Catalonia Region                                .2588675        .4380129 
Mediterranean Region                            .0995981        .2994635 
Northern Region (excl Catalonia)                .1894797        .3918894 
Castilla: Centre (excl Madrid)                  .1087075        .3112721 
South Region                                    .1420168        .3490675 
duration                                        56.50742        44.24135 
duration1                                       5150.384        6863.411 
duration2                                       580455.7         1053404 
Voluntary Termination Empl                      .0522693        .2225696 
Sector empl: Primary Sector                     .0026746        .0516475 
Sector empl: Secondary Sector                   .1563661        .3632023 
Sector empl: Tertiary Sector                    .3441236        .4750818 
Sector empl: Education                          .0833686        .2764387 
Sector empl: Social Services                    .2569224        .4369364 
Part-time Contract                              .0962745        .2949675 
Number Years Contributed 15-45                  13.67125        7.886595 
Tenure                                          7.387752        7.285841 
Temporary Contract                              .5133439        .4998221 
Temporary Contract * (log dur)                  1.828531        1.963227 
Cohort born in 1941-1946                        .236746        .4250853 
Cohort born in 1947-1951                       .3105076        .4627016 
Cohort born in 1952-1956                       .2807694        .4493752 
Cohort born in 1957-1961                       .0779363        .2680715 
Unem Rate CCAA                                  14.62729         6.14194 
(Unem Rate CCAA)*(log dur)                      52.20523        27.98231 
Unem Rate Sector                                4.837684        3.403539 
(Unem Rate Sector)*(log dur)                     17.1973        13.66126 
Av Hours Worked Sector                          38.95804        2.566424 
(Av Hours Worked)*(log dur)                     139.5169        44.39457 
GDP growth                                      2.980086        1.303055 
age52                                           .0150097        .1215914 
age55                                           .0087953        .0933699 
age58                                           .0046567        .0680811 
 
N                                                1215877              
 
  
3. Promoting Employment of 
Disabled Women in Spain; 
Evaluating a Policy 
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3.1 Introduction28 
During the last years, disability policies have attracted particular attention in 
OECD countries both because they represent an important source of government 
expenditure and because societies are becoming more and more concerned about 
the need to strengthen the integration of disabled individuals in the society.   
Countries in the OECD have tightened the conditions to access the 
unemployment and social assistance schemes introducing several work 
requirements while, at the same time, early retirement schemes have been limited 
(or even abolished) because of their well-documented work disincentives. These 
events have resulted in increasing numbers of pre-retirement individuals entering 
the disability schemes which, together with the ageing process of developed 
societies, raises concerns about the mid-term effects of disability expenses on the 
government’s budget (OECD, 2007a, 2007b).  
On the other hand, several studies and organizations of people with 
disabilities have stressed the need to promote the labour market integration of 
disabled individuals as a way of facilitating their broader integration in the society. 
The pre-conception that disability completely disables the individual for any kind 
of job is totally unfounded and some effort should be made in order to analyze 
how their abilities can be matched with labour market opportunities (OECD, 2003). 
For these reasons, the possibility of increasing the number of disabled 
people that work is regarded as a good way to decrease the pressures on the 
financial stability of the social security system as well as to reach the social 
integration of disabled individuals.  
As the OECD puts it; “Helping (disabled) people to work is potentially a 
“win-win” policy: it helps people avoid exclusion and have higher incomes while 
raising the prospect of more effective labour supply and higher economic output in 
the long term” (OECD, 2007a). 
This seems to be a reasonable policy objective specially if we take into 
account two current developments that will provide new opportunities; on the one 
hand, medical advances will open up the possibilities for disabled people to stay 
healthier at older ages while, on the other hand, technological innovations will 
facilitate the adaptation of the working environment to the special requirements of 
the disabled.  
                                                           
28 This chapter is based on: Vall-Castello, J. (2010). Promoting Employment of Disabled Women in 
Spain: Evaluating a Policy. FEDEA Working Paper 2010-10, Madrid, Spain. 
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However, there are several entry barriers to the labour market that 
individuals with disabilities face, which partially explain the low employment 
rates of this group of people:  
1. Physical barriers: adaptation of the working space. 
2. Stigma: prevents disabled individuals from receiving job offers.   
3. Mismatch: the job search process is more complicated as it is more 
difficult to receive the “adequate” job offer; employers don’t know 
the specificities of the disabling condition nor the way in which they 
will affect the type of job that they offer. 
Therefore, there is a need for new specific policies that take into account all 
the specificities explained above in order to ensure their effectiveness and the real 
integration of the disabled into the labour market and into society. 
The promotion of employment of disabled individuals is particularly 
relevant for the Spanish case and, in 2007, the OECD identified it as the most 
“formidable” challenge facing the Spanish government with respect to disability 
policies (see Figure 21). This is mainly due to two reasons: the significantly lower 
employment rates of disabled individuals in Spain with respect to other OECD 
countries and the higher proportion of older workers in the disability scheme. In 
that sense, 70% of all disabled individuals receiving disability benefits in Spain are 
on the age range of 50-64 years old (see Figure 22). 
In terms of employment rates of disabled individuals, they have remained 
quite low at a 30% level29 even if GDP growth has been quite high at around 2-6% 
during the last ten years and the general unemployment rate has dropped from 
20% to 9,2%30. This employment rate of 30% is one of the lowest in the OECD, 
where employment rates for disabled individuals are 45% in the UK, 40% in 
Australia, 50% in Luxembourg, 45% in Norway or 52% in Switzerland (see Figure 
23).  
                                                           
29 The general employment rate has increased by 7% in the last 5 years. Employment rates stand at 65% 
(at the OECD average). 3,5% of the Spanish population is receiving disability benefits. 
30 Unemployment rates of disabled individuals have also remained constant at 15%. 
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Figure 22 Disability recipients by age and gender as a share of total disabled individuals, 2005 
 
Source:  OECD 2007a;  National authorities:  DEWR Australia;  IGSS Luxembourg;  MTAS 
Spain; DWP United Kingdom. 
The magnitude of the policy challenge in Australia, Luxembourg, Spain and the United Kingdom, 2007 
Seven key policy challengesa,b Australia Luxembourg Spain 
United 
Kingdom 
1) Controlling incapacity-related public spending ++ +++ ++ ++ 
2) Raising employment rates for people with health 
problems 
 
+++ + ++++ ++ 
3) Tackling lower incomes of households with disabled 
people 
 
+++ + ++ +++ 
4) Reducing the inflow into sickness and disability 
benefits 
 
++ ++ ++ ++++ 
5) Addressing the increasing medicalisation of labour 
market problems 
 
++ ++ + +++ 
6) Raising the outflow from usually permanent 
disability benefits 
 
+++ +++ ++ ++ 
7) Strengthening co-ordination across different benefit 
schemes ++ +++ +++ ++ 
a) The scales should be interpreted as follows: + … minor challenge; ++ … moderate challenge; +++ ... substantial 
challenge; and ++++ … formidable challenge. 
b) Public spending on sickness and disability benefits excludes employer-paid wage payments in the first weeks 
of absence. Relative poverty is defined as the share of persons with incomes below 50% of the median income of 
the entire population.  
Source: OECD, 2007a. 
Figure 21 Calibration of the magnitude of several challenges in disability policies. 
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Figure 23 Employment rates of disabled individuals 
 
Source:  OECD 2007a.  
Furthermore, spending on disability benefits has been quite high in Spain 
and it stood at 1,2% of GDP in 2005. This is an important quantity as, for example, 
unemployment-related expenditures reached 2,5% of GDP in 2005. However, 
unemployment policies have traditionally raised much more attention among 
researchers and policy makers than disability policies. 
Having revised the evolution of the main characteristics of disability policies 
and after highlighting the main challenges regarding the labour market integration 
of disabled individuals in Spain, the aim of this chapter is to understand the way in 
which a particular change in employer’s incentives (an increase in the deductions 
of employer’s social security contributions for hiring disabled women) affects 
employment rates of disabled women31.  
In order to do that, we first explore the characteristics and evolution of the 
group of individuals that is the focus of our research, i.e. individuals receiving a 
permanent disability pension, in order to get some insights on the evolution of 
their labour market participation from 1996 until 2007. In doing that, we realize the 
possibility of having differential trends between men and women in our sample 
before the implementation of the policy in 2004. If this is so, the basic assumption 
of traditional difference-and-difference models would not be fulfilled. Therefore, 
when we proceed to the econometric analysis of the effectiveness of the policy 
measure in increasing employment of disabled women, we condition on any 
preexisting trends. When describing the characteristics of our sample, we also 
                                                           
31 There are also other employment promotion measures in place for disabled individuals such as a 2% 
quota for firms of more than 50 employees and a subsidy for firm’s that hire a disabled worker. 
However, the 2% quota threshold is not implemented by Spanish firms and the authorities do not 
enforce the fulfillment of this quota system. 
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realize that disabled women suffer from a double discrimination in the labour 
market as they have a much lower probability of working than disabled men. This 
observation reinforces the need to introduce policy initiatives that aim at 
counterbalancing this discrimination. 
At the same time, another important issue to take into consideration is the 
crucial role that will be played by the different degrees of disability benefits 
available in the Spanish system that entail different working restrictions as well as 
pension amounts. For this reason, we choose a bivariate probit model as our 
estimation strategy to be able to model the employment situation and the type of 
pension received in a simultaneous way. The final goal of the research is to draw 
some conclusions on the type of policy initiatives that could be more effective in 
promoting employment among disabled individuals. 
The present work contributes to the literature in two dimensions. First, it 
estimates the employment effects of a policy change that has never been analyzed 
before as an employment promotion tool for disabled individuals. Although there 
have been studies that have focused on the estimation of anti-discrimination 
legislation and quotas with respect to disabled workers, we are not aware of any 
studies that analyze the effects of deductions on the social security contributions 
for employers on the employment prospects of disabled individuals.   
Second, we try to fill in the information gap existing in Spain with regards to 
the labour market behavior of disabled individuals and its evolution over time. 
There are only three cross-sectional surveys focusing on disabled individuals and 
only one of them pays special attention to the relation between disability and work 
(EDAD 1999 and 2008 and EPA 2002). Therefore, there is a lack of information on 
the evolution of employment rates of disabled individuals over time. To our 
knowledge, we are the first ones to use a longitudinal database on disability 
benefits to shed some light on the composition and labour market situation of 
permanent disability pensioners in the Spanish economy.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: section 2 explains the disability system in 
Spain and the compatibility of the benefits with paid work. Section 3 reviews the 
main literature focusing on the combination of disability benefits and a job and on 
the type of policies that can be introduced to foster employment of disabled 
individuals. Section 4 presents the data used while section 5 includes some 
descriptive statistics which allow us to draw a number of conclusions of the 
evolution of the population receiving disability benefits in Spain. Section 6 explains 
the econometric approach used in the analysis and presents the main results and 
section 7 introduces some robustness checks. Finally, the main conclusions and 
policy recommendations are derived in the last part of the chapter, section 8.  
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3.2 Types of disability benefits & compatibility with a 
job 
In Spain, permanent contributive32 disability benefits are defined as the 
economic benefits that aim at compensating the individual for losing a certain 
amount of wage or professional earnings when the person is affected by a 
reduction or a complete loss of his/her working ability in a way that is assumed to 
be permanent due to the effects of a pathologic or traumatic process derived from 
an illness or an accident33.  
In order to capture the different situations in which a person can be after 
suffering from a disabling condition, the Spanish Social Security administration 
differentiates between four degrees of disability that depend on the amount of 
working capacity that has been lost: 
Permanent Limited disability for the usual job: is the kind of disability that, 
without reaching the level of partial disability, causes a decrease to the individual 
of at least 33% of the standard performance for his/her usual job but the individual 
is still able to develop the fundamental tasks of his/her usual job or professional 
activity. 
Permanent Partial disability for the usual job (PD):  is the kind of 
impairment that disables the individual to develop all or the fundamental tasks of 
his/her usual job or professional activity but the individual is still capable of 
developing a different job or professional activity. 
Permanent Total disability for all jobs (TD): is the kind of impairment that 
disables the individual for the development of any kind of job or professional 
activity. 
Severe disability: is the situation for which, as a result of anatomic or 
functional loses, the individual needs the assistance of a third person to develop 
the most essential acts of live such as eating, moving, etc… 
Therefore, the degree of disability in which the individual is classified is set 
in relation to the working capacity lost as the goal of the benefits is to compensate 
for the reduction on wages or professional earnings caused by the disabling 
                                                           
32 Please note that, for the purpose of this paper, we only focus on contributive benefits, that is, 
economic benefits that require having contributed to the Social Security before becoming disabled 
(employed or receiving unemployment benefits). The reasons are; data availability problems for non-
contributory pensioners and the idea that disabled individuals that have worked before are probably in 
a better position to find a new job.  
33 Own translation of the definition of permanent disability given by the Spanish Social Security 
administration at www.seg-social.es.  
70 
 
condition. The amount of pension received varies according to the disability 
degree in which the individual is classified. For example, individuals in the partial 
disability scheme receive, in general, 55% of the regulatory base (which is an 
average of the last salaries) because they are assumed to get some income from 
work that would allow them to reach a similar amount of money than before 
becoming disabled34. On the contrary, total disability benefits provide a 100% of 
the regulatory base as the individual is considered to have lost all his/her ability to 
work and, thus, is (in principle) unable to get any extra income from work. 
However, when defining the compatibilities of each of these kinds of 
benefits, the Social Security administration states that the receipt of a total 
disability pension will not impede the development of those activities (both paid 
and unpaid) that are compatible with the disability status of the individual and 
that do not represent a change in his working ability.  
Therefore, it can be concluded from this revision of the legislation that both 
partial and total disability pensioners are entitled to take up a job if the 
characteristics of it are in accordance with the definition of the type of disability 
that has been described above. At the same time and in line with the definitions, it 
seems clear that total disability holders will have a lower capacity to work than 
partial disability pensioners.     
However, as it will be shown in the descriptive statistics of the next section, 
even if disability pensioners in Spain are “legally” given the option to combine the 
disability pension with a job, the data analysis reveals that most of the disabled 
individuals in Spain are, in fact, not working.  
As our interest lies on the effectiveness of a policy initiative in increasing 
employment of disabled individuals, we restrict our analysis to disabled 
individuals in the partial and total disability schemes. We have included total 
disability holders because, even if these individuals have more restrictions to work, 
we observe in the data that some of them do work and we considered that it was 
important to include them. We don’t include Limited disability holders because 
they are allowed to continue in their previous job and the benefit given is paid only 
in one installment so that there are really no incentives/disincentives to work to 
analyze.  
                                                           
34 For individuals in the partial disability scheme, this 55% increases to a 75% at the age of 55 years old if 
the individual is found to be unlikely to find a job. This disincentive to work is studied in the following 
chapter. See Table 18 below for a summary on the way in which the pension amount is calculated. 
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3.3 Disability and work: A survey 
The literature that assesses the effects of policy initiatives that try to promote 
employment rates of disabled individuals has mainly focused on anti-
discrimination legislation and has been concentrated both on the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), which was introduced in 1990 in the United States of 
America, and on the Disability Discrimination Act of 1995 in the UK. 
Taking advantage of the different timing on the implementation of the ADA 
in numerous states, two groups of authors find opposing results of the effects of 
the introduction of this policy. On the one hand, DeLeire (2000), Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2001) and Beegle and Stock (2003) conclude that ADA has not increased 
employment for disabled individuals whereas, on the other hand, Kruse and Schur 
(2003) argue that these findings result from the imprecise information on disability 
status used by the authors and warn that the results must be interpreted with care 
and are not conclusive. Jolls and Prescott (2004) and Jolls (2004) find that the main 
effect of ADA was the increase in the returns on education which, in turn, raised 
education participation of disabled individuals as well as their employment 
prospects. 
The results obtained by the first set of authors about the introduction of 
ADA in the USA coincide with the findings of Bell and Heitmueller (2005) for the 
UK Disability Discrimination Act in the sense that the authors are not able to find 
any significant impact on employment prospects for disabled individuals after the 
introduction of this new anti-discrimination legislation. 
Another two studies focus on the evaluation of an alternative policy 
initiative to promote employment for disabled individuals; the introduction of 
disabled vs. non-disabled quotas for employees. First, Wagner et al. (2001) analyze 
the impact of employment quotas on job dynamics in 400 small firms in Germany 
and they find no effect of the quota threshold. In a more recent paper, Lalive et al. 
(2009) analyze increases in the demand for disabled workers of an employment 
quota introduced in Austria in 1969 that required firms to hire at least one disabled 
individual per 25 non-disabled employees. If firms failed to comply with this 
obligation they were subject to the payment of a tax for each unfilled quota slot. 
The authors exploit the discontinuous change in financial incentives for firms 
below and above the quantities of the quota threshold (25, 50, 75…) with a 
regression discontinuity approach model and find that the elasticity of substitution 
between disabled and non-disabled workers is around 2.4 for the first threshold 
(and 0.7 for higher thresholds). However, they also note that this change does not 
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occur in the short-term as firms need some time to comply with employment quota 
rules. 
They also find different effects for different firms and sectors of the 
economy; firms paying higher wages seem to have a lower response to the quota 
requirements as the monetary non-compliance fine is defined per-head. Firms in 
the manufactures sector show the strongest effect to the quota requirements while 
services and construction firms lie below the average effect. The authors attribute 
these differences between sectors of the economy to the role of technology in 
facilitating the accommodation of disabled workers.        
Even if the evaluation of policy initiatives to increase employment of 
disabled workers has captured some attention among USA and European 
researchers, in Spain the majority of studies that include an analysis of the 
disability system are centered on the evaluation of the use of the disability scheme 
as an alternative exit route from the labour force, particularly for older workers 
approaching retirement (see, for example, Blanco (2000), Jimenez et al. (2006 & 
2009).  
Yet these kinds of studies are exclusively focused on entries into disability, 
disregarding the labour market trajectory of these individuals once they are 
accepted in the scheme. We are aware of only one paper by Malo et al. (2007) that 
uses Spanish data and focuses on the possibilities for disabled individuals to 
combine the receipt of the benefits with the development of a job once the 
individual starts receiving a disability pension. Using a cross-sectional sample for 
2006, they estimate logistic regressions in order to analyze the variables that affect 
the probability of combining a disability pension with a job. However, their paper 
is mainly a descriptive study which does not include any analysis of employment 
promotion policies. 
Therefore, there are no previous studies analyzing the effect of employment 
promotion measures for disabled individuals in Spain, which is partly due to the 
lack of data availability as well as to the lack of compliance of the 2% employment 
quota required for Spanish firms with more than 50 employees. 
3.4 Database and sample selection 
The study will use the Continuous Sample of Working Lives (“Muestra 
Continua de Vidas Laborales”, MCVL) which is a microeconomic data set of the 
Spanish Social Security Administration. It contains a random sample of 4% of all 
the individuals who, at some point during 2007, had contributed towards the social 
security system.  
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There is information available on the entire employment and pension history 
of the workers and several variables that describe the characteristics of the job or 
the unemployment/disability benefits. The macroeconomic variables used to 
capture the economic business cycle are from the Spanish “Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica”. 
We select in our sample all individuals who are receiving a partial or total 
disability pension in 1996-2007. The pooled sample contains 49.989 individuals, of 
which 34.357 are men and 15.632 women. As new individuals become disabled and 
start receiving disability benefits each year, the sample is growing from an initial 
size of 19.961 individuals in 1996 up to 31.737 individuals in 200735. We include 
individuals from 17 to 64 years old. We don’t include ages above 64 years old as all 
disabled individuals are automatically transferred to old-age benefits when they 
reach age 65. Therefore, individuals leave the sample mainly because they reach 
age 64 and also, few individuals leave because they stop receiving the disability 
pension (only 0,15% of the sample). 
3.5 Descriptive statistics 
From Table 11 below we can derive the main characteristics of the sample. It 
is composed by a majority of men, as only 28.8% of the observations are from 
women, and by low educated individuals, as half of the observations come from 
individuals who dropped out of education before finishing high school, 23% of the 
individuals hold a high school diploma (or equivalent) and only 9% of the sample 
is composed by people with a bachelor’s degree and other higher education36. Our 
data confirms some of the observations highlighted in the OECD report such as the 
fact that disabled individuals in Spain are relatively old, as the average age of 
disabled individuals in our sample is 53.4 years old. They also appear to be a 
relatively poor group, as our data shows that the average monthly pension is 624 
euro. However, this quantity varies substantially among individuals, as 55% of 
them receive a pension below 500 euro/month, 40% get between 500 and 1500 
euro/month and 4.6% receive a pension above 1500 euro/month.   
                                                           
35 See Table 17 in the appendix to see the number of individuals each year in the sample. 
36 These percentages are very close to the ones found in the EDAD-1999 and EDAD-2008 surveys of 
disabled individuals in Spain, which are based on a broader sample of the disabled population than our 
sample (as our sample only includes permanent & contributory disability pensioners). 
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Table 11 Summary statistics selected variables. 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
 
      Female |    294366    .2881345    .4528948          0          1 
Educ. level1 |    294366    .5139962    .4998049          0          1 
Educ. level2 |    294366    .2366748    .4250417          0          1 
Educ. level3 |    294366    .0931018    .2905755          0          1 
         Age |    294366    53.45321    8.801795         17         64 
     Pension |    294366    624.0395    451.7436          0   17227.91 
    P. 0-500 |    294366    .5564365    .4968056          0          1 
 P. 500-1500 |    294366    .3967951    .4892337          0          1 
P.Above 1500 |    294366    .0467683    .2111426          0          1 
Age Disabil. |    294366    46.12592    10.11334         10         64 
 
Therefore, if these individuals do not have any other source of income, such 
as a job, we can expect to have high poverty rates among disabled individuals, as 
more than half of the sample earn a monthly pension well below the Spanish 
minimum wage, which was set at 624 euro for 200937.  
At the same time, according to our data, the financial resources available to 
disabled individuals that work are, on average, 46% higher than those of disabled 
without a job. Therefore, a policy that is effective in increasing the labour market 
prospects of disabled individuals and that helps them in finding a job, not only 
increases their social integration, but it also prevents them from falling into 
poverty.   
Table 12 presents the summary statistics according to working/not working 
observations. It can be observed that disabled individuals that work are mainly 
men, a bit more educated, young and with a slightly lower pension amount, who 
become disabled at a younger age. Thus, both the current age as well as the age at 
which he/she becomes disabled, appear to be important factors in determining 
their chances to find a job. 
                                                           
37 The minimum wage in Spain was 390,18 euro in 1996; 424,8 in 2000 and 490,80 in 2004. 
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Table 12 Summary statistics selected variables by working status 
 
NOT WORKING: 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
 
      Female |    268930    .3043245    .4601216          0          1 
Educ. level1 |    268930    .5277507    .4992302          0          1 
Educ. level2 |    268930    .2247165    .4173962          0          1 
Educ. level3 |    268930    .0910572    .2876909          0          1 
         Age |    268930    54.05436    8.509114         17         64 
     Pension |    268930    635.1704    458.4892          0   17227.91 
    P. 0-500 |    268930    .5464507    .4978386          0          1 
 P. 500-1500 |    268930    .4038114    .4906614          0          1 
P.Above 1500 |    268930    .0497378    .2174032          0          1 
Age Disabil. |    268930    46.90183    9.790287         10         64 
 
WORKING: 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
 
      Female |     25436    .1169602    .3213792          0          1 
Educ. level1 |     25436    .3685721     .482427          0          1 
Educ. level2 |     25436    .3631074    .4809049          0          1 
Educ. level3 |     25436    .1147193    .3186891          0          1 
         Age |     25436    47.09734    9.317987         18         64 
     Pension |     25436    506.3546    352.1352          0   10275.09 
    P. 0-500 |     25436    .6620145    .4730329          0          1 
 P. 500-1500 |     25436    .3226136    .4674855          0          1 
P.Above 1500 |     25436    .0153719    .1230293          0          1 
Age Disabil. |     25436    37.92239     9.82861         15         64 
 
If we make use of the time series dimension of the data, we can see that the 
number of disabled individuals (both men and women) has increased over time 
since 1996 (see Table 17) but the percentage of disabled men/women has remained 
quite stable. Similarly, the proportion of individuals with a partial/total disability 
pension in the sample has also remained constant during these years (see Figure 
24). This stability in the composition of the sample reinforces the idea that no major 
changes have occurred in the evolution of the characteristics of the sample during 
this period. 
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Figure 24 Evolution of the percentages of women and total disability pensioners in the sample. 
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The probability of working for disabled individuals has also increased over 
the sample period, both for men and women. This probability has been calculated 
performing a series of cross-sectional probit estimations and predicting the 
probability of working for each year and for each sub-group of the population 
studied38.  
Even if it is increasing, the probability of working for disabled individuals is 
quite low and it reaches its maximum value, which is only 12%, in 2007 (see Figure 
25). Disabled women have a much lower probability of working than disabled men 
(approximately half), which can be compared in Figure 26 and Figure 27. This 
observation reinforces the idea of the need to introduce policy initiatives that are 
particularly targeted to disabled women and that are designed to increase their 
labour market prospects in order to reverse this discrimination problem that they 
suffer in the Spanish labour market.  
                                                           
38 Please note that no covariates are included in this model so that there are no controls for the several 
different sources of heterogeneity, which will be introduced in the econometric section below. 
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Figure 25 Evolution of the probability of working for disabled individuals in our sample 
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Figure 26 Evolution of the probability of working for disabled women in our sample 
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Figure 27 Evolution of the probability of working for disabled men in our sample 
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3.6 Econometric analysis 
3.6.1 The baseline model 
Given that, as explained above, individuals can receive two different types 
of benefits which are defined according to the remaining capacity to work kept by 
the disabled individual and, in order to take into account in the estimation the 
number of individuals in each of these two types of benefits, we have chosen to use 
a bivariate probit model as the estimation method. This model allows us to 
estimate movements in the labour market and between types of pension 
simultaneously and to incorporate the correlation in residuals of the two equations 
due to unobserved characteristics (such as the effective remaining “capacity to 
work”). 
In order to introduce the policy variables, we have constructed a table (Table 
13) which contains a summary of the major reforms implemented by the Spanish 
central government in order to provide incentives for firms to hire disabled 
individuals. The majority of these incentives were first established in 1983 
following what was ruled in 1982 by the (very important) law “Ley de Integracion 
Social de los Minusvalidos” (Social Integration of the Disabled). The LISMI, as it 
was later called, set up the basic pillars of public policies towards disabled 
individuals in terms of anti-discrimination and employment promotion measures 
which were later converted into concrete measures in 1983 in the form of a 
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statutory order. In terms of employment protection, the 1983 statutory order 
introduced the requirement for firms with more than 50 employees to have at least 
2% of disabled workers among their employees39. On the other hand, as 
employment promotion measures, it established a subsidy of 500.000 pessetas 
(3.012 euros) for each disabled worker that the firm hired, as well as a 70% 
deduction of the social security contributions for each disabled worker younger 
than 45 years old that was hired or a 90% deduction if the individual was older 
than 45 years old. 
After the LISMI was implemented, only some minor changes were 
introduced up until 2004, when a differential treatment for disabled women was 
introduced in the measures directed towards promoting the labour market 
integration of disabled workers. Therefore, deductions to the Social Security 
contributions to hire disabled women were increased from 70 to 90% for women 
below 45 years old and from 90 to 100% for women aged 45 and over. Apart from 
this reform in 2004, there was a substantial reorganization of the packet of firms’ 
incentives in 2006 when deductions were changed from a percentage to a fixed 
amount of the monthly contribution that the employer has to pay to the 
administration for each disabled individual. However, this reform in 2006 did not 
involve any increase in the deductions previously given and, instead, it only 
changed the way in which these deductions were computed from a percentage to a 
fixed amount. Therefore, we are confident that this reform did not entail changes 
in the hiring behavior of employers and will not interfere in our identification 
strategy of the policy effects of the increase in the deductions for disabled women 
in 2004. 
Figure 26 and  Figure 27 above plot the probability for individuals in the 
sample to have a job for each calendar year from 1996 until 2007. These figures 
seem to suggest an acceleration of the increase in the probability for disabled 
women to have a job from 2004 onwards while the probability for disabled men to 
have a job seems to grow at a relatively constant rate for the entire period. 
                                                           
39 However, it is well known in Spain that this employment quota is not implemented by employers and 
that there are no monitoring or punishment mechanisms in place.  
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Table 13 Legislative reforms in firm’s incentives in Spain. 
Years Type of 
Incentive 
Permanent & Full-
time contract 
Temporary 
contract 
(part or full-
time) 
Permanent & Part-
time contract 
Self-employed 
Subsidy1 
Subsidy2 
500.000 ptas/contract 
Avoid accidents  
   Status 
Quo: 
1983 Deductions SS 
contributions 
70% if < 45 
90% if >=45 
   
Subsidy1 650.000 ptas/contract  Proportional to h  
1999 
(Jan) Deductions SS 
contributions 
  
70% if < 45 
90% if >=45 
 
Deductions in 
firm’s taxes 
6.000 euro for each 
person/year of 
increase over the 
mean of disabled 
workers wrt mean of 
non-disabled 
 
6.000 for each 
person/year of 
increase over the 
mean of disabled 
workers wrt mean 
of non-disabled 
 
2002 
(Dec) 
 
 
(April) 
Deductions SS 
contributions 
   50% for 3 years 
Deductions SS 
contributions 
90% if <45 & women 
100% if >=45 & 
women 
 
90% if <45 & 
women 
100% if >=45 & 
women 
 
Subsidy1 
3.907 eur/contract 
(no change) 
 Proportional to h40  
2004 
(Jan) 
Subsidy2 
Avoid accidents & 
adjust working 
space 
(max.901,52eur) 
Avoid 
accidents & 
adjust working 
space 
  
2006 
(Dec) 
Deductions SS 
contributions  
375 euro/month 
425 if  severe 
disability41 
+100 if >=45 years 
+70,83 if women 
291,66 euro/ 
month 
341,66 if severe 
disability 
+50 if >=45 
+50 if women 
42100% of full-time 
if h=3/4 
75% if 1/2>h<3/4 
50% if  1/4>h<1/2 
25% if h<1/4 
50% for 5 years 
Subsidy3    
Establish; max 
10.000 euro  
External 
Services; 75% 
of cost, max 
2.000 euro 
Education; 
75% of cost, 
max 3.000 euro 
2007 
(June) 
Interest rate 
reduction 
   
4 points : loans 
for investment 
 
                                                           
40 Number of working hours 
41 I will not be able to identify individuals with a severe disability, as I don’t have information on the 
specific disability of each individual. 
42 Also for temporary and part-time contracts. 
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Therefore, in order to identify whether the policy introduced in 2004 
induced a differential change in employment for disabled women relative to 
disabled men, we estimate a series of difference-in-differences models. The key 
identifying assumption in traditional difference-in-differences models is that the 
change in the outcome variable of interest, Y, in recent years would have been the 
same for women as it was for men in the absence of the 2004 policy change. If this 
assumption is correct, then the parameters β’s capture the policy-induced change 
in the outcome variable Y. However, to the extent that differential trends in Y 
between the group of men and women are present even prior to the policy change, 
this would suggest that the identifying assumptions are questioned. Therefore, and 
following the methodology in Autor & Duggan (2008), we estimate a model that 
evaluates the existence of any shift in the trend of the outcome variable in the 
women relative to men sample following the policy change and conditional on any 
preexisting trends. 
The baseline model is given by the following two equations: 
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(Equation 13) 
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The first dependent variable, 
1
jty , captures the type of pension that the 
individual j is receiving at time t and equals 0 if he/she receives a partial disability 
pension and 1 when it is a total disability pension. The second dependent variable, 
2
jty , is 0 if the individual j is not working at time t and 1 when he/she has a job. 
Fj is an indicator variable that equals 1 if individual j is a female and 0 
otherwise, while Jt is a vector of twelve indicator variables for each of the years 
included in our sample. We also include interactions of these year dummies with 
the person’s year of birth (YOB) in order to account for the different effect of the 
macroeconomic environment on labour force participation of disabled individuals 
of different cohorts (or years of birth). The ε’s characterize the corresponding BVN 
error terms.  
The parameters of interest are captured by the β’s; β0 represents the pre-
existing trend in the women relative to the men group just before the policy change 
and β1 captures any change in the women relative to the men trend following the 
policy change43. Furthermore and to the extent that the policy introduced different 
deductions of the SS contributions for women above and below 45, we could 
expect to detect a differential effect of the policy for these two age groups. We will 
examine this possibility by estimating separate models of the bivariate probit for 
two separate groups of disabled individuals (< or => age 45). 
In a next step, we introduce a number of covariates to the previous model to 
control for some personal observable characteristics that could affect both the 
labour market situation of disabled individuals as well as the type of pension that 
they receive. These covariates are the level of education, age, age at which they 
became disabled, immigrant from other regions of Spain, the level of the disability 
benefit, 3 dummies for special professional schemes (agriculture, self-employed 
and working accident), regional fixed effects for each of the 17 Autonomous 
Communities in Spain and a dummy that is 1 if the individual lives in a town of 
less than 40.000 citizens44. Apart from these variables that are included in both 
equations of the model, we also include in the first equation two more variables 
that are only related to the type of pension received and act as exclusion 
restrictions in order to improve the identification of the parameters of the model. 
These variables are the percentage of Disability Evaluation Offices (DEO), which is 
obtained by dividing the number of disability evaluation offices in each of the 52 
provinces by the population in that province, and the percentage of disability 
benefits granted in each Autonomous Community (AC), which is obtained by 
                                                           
43 We take 2005 to be the first year after the policy but the results don’t change that much if we use year 
2004 as the first year after the policy. 
44 These variables are explained in more detail in the appendix section. 
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dividing the number of benefits granted each year in each AC (17) by the 
population in each autonomous community. This last variable is introduced with 
the aim of capturing the way (rigorous/flexible) in which the health conditions are 
evaluated in each region45.  
This choice of exclusion restrictions is based on two things; first, it seems 
reasonable for us to accept the assumption that these two variables will have an 
effect on the probability for disabled individuals of being classified as 
partial/totally disabled while not affecting their employment probabilities. Second, 
we’ve run simple probit models for both equations separately and have checked 
that these variables are, in effect, not significant when included in the employment 
equation.  
3.6.2 Results from the baseline model 
Table 14 presents the results of the models without the variables that capture 
personal characteristics. The first column provides results from the bivariate probit 
model for all the sample of individuals aged 17 to 64. As the results show, 
employment was significantly lower for women than for men at the start of the 
sample period in 1996. This labour market disadvantage widened between the two 
genders in the years prior to the policy change although the coefficient is not 
statistically significant (β0). After the policy was launched, this trend reversed 
considerably with a positive and significant coefficient for β1 suggesting the fact 
that the policy introduced the necessary incentives for employers to hire disabled 
women vis-à-vis disabled men. 
At the same time, results show that the policy had also an impact on the 
probability of receiving a total disability pension for women. At the beginning of 
the period, women were receiving less total disability benefits than men. However, 
the positive and significant β0 coefficient suggests that this disparity was reduced 
during the years before the introduction of the policy with women receiving more 
total disability benefits than men. Nevertheless, once the policy was initiated, this 
trend reversed and women received less total disability benefits vis-à-vis men. 
                                                           
45 We have also test to estimate the models with only one of the two exclusion restrictions and results 
remain the same. 
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Table 14 Estimation bivariate probit model, all years all ages. 
  
The estimated correlation coefficient between the two equations is negative 
and very significant which suggests the existence of unobserved factors that are 
relevant and that affect the probability of finding a job and the probability of 
receiving a total disability pension in opposite directions. 
The second and third columns of Table 14 show results for the bivariate probit 
specification for two separate samples of individuals; younger than 45 years old, 
and individuals who are 45 or older. The effect of the policy in reversing a negative 
employment trend and increasing the labour market opportunities for disabled 
women are much stronger and very significant for the age group of individuals 
below age 45. On the other hand, the impact of the policy seems to be insignificant 
for individuals who are 45 years or more. 
 Bivariate Probit: All 
Bivariate Probit: 
Age<45 
Bivariate Probit: 
Age> 45 
 Total Dis Work Total Dis Work Total Dis Work 
Fj -.119*** -.532*** .110* -.449*** -.159*** -.573*** 
Fjyr98 .011*** -0.008 .020** -.031** .009** -0.003 
Fjyr05 -.019** .031* -.034* .079** -.015* 0.017 
Constant -.204*** -1.66*** -.307*** -1.21*** -.185*** -1.79*** 
log-lik -2.7E+05  -5.3E+04  -2.2E+05  
N 304040  50389  253651  
Rho -.625***  -.796***  -.571***  
YRS*YOB Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dum Yes Yes Yes 
Cov. No No No 
Years 1996-2007 1996-2007 1996-2007 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 15 Estimation bivariate probit model with covariates and exclusion restrictions, all years all 
ages. 
 Bivariate Probit: 
All 
Bivariate Probit; 
Age<45 
Bivariate Probit; 
Age>45 
 Total Dis Work 
Total 
Dis Work 
Total 
Dis Work 
Fj -0.017 -.568*** -0.006 -.447*** -0.034 -.622*** 
Fjyr98 .015*** -0.008 .035*** -.024* .013*** -0.004 
Fjyr05 -0.006 0.026 -0.019 .060* -0.006 0.016 
Percentr .144*  0.042  .155*  
Percpen -.036**  -0.068  -.036**  
Constant 1.68*** -.687*** 1.48*** -.449*** 1.81*** -.747*** 
log-lik -2.3E+05  -4.4E+04  -1.9E+05  
N 304040  50389  253651  
Rho -.601***  -.769***  -.547***  
YRS*YOB Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dum Yes Yes Yes 
Cov. Yes Yes Yes 
Years 1996-2007 1996-2007 1996-2007 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Note: Covariates include the level of education, age, age at which 
they became disabled, immigrant from other regions of Spain, the level 
of the disability benefit, 3 dummies for special professional schemes 
(agriculture, self-employed and working accident), regional fixed 
effects for each of the 17 Autonomous Communities in Spain, a dummy if 
the individual lives in a town and the two exclusion restrictions: the 
percentage of Disability Evaluation Offices (DEO) in each of the 52 
provinces and the percentage of disability benefits granted in each 
Autonomous Community (AC). 
 
Table 15 includes results of the specifications with the variables that 
capture personal characteristics in the model46. In general, the results are very 
similar than the models without personal characteristics. However, for the 
bivariate probit model, the β1 coefficients for the effect of the policy on the 
probability of finding a job for disabled women vis-à-vis disabled men are no 
longer significant when we include these new covariates. As there are two 
variables that act as exclusion restrictions (which are only included in the type of 
                                                           
46 Covariates include the level of education, age, age at which they became disabled, immigrants from 
another region in Spain, the level of disability benefit, 3 dummies for special professional schemes 
(agriculture, self-employed and working accident), regional fixed effects, dummy for a city/town and 
the two exclusion restrictions: percentage of Disability Evaluation Offices in each province and the 
percentage of disability benefits granted in each Autonomous Community.  
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pension equation), the results of the bivariate probit model are better identified 
than in Table 14.  
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 15 report the results of the estimations for the 
sample of individuals younger than 45 years old and for the sample of individuals 
of 45 years or more. Again, results are pretty similar than the ones obtained in Table 
14 when no personal characteristics were introduced. The main results is that β1 is 
still positive and significant for the sample of disabled individuals below 45 years 
old, implying that the deteriorating trend in employment prospects that existed for 
disabled women before the implementation of the policy was reversed by the 
introduction of the policy and employment increased for women with respect to 
men from the year 2004 onwards for this younger group of workers. 
3.7 Robustness checks 
3.7.1 The definition of disability 
As we have explained above, our definition of disability includes only 
disabled individuals who are receiving a permanent contributory disability 
pension, as this administrative dataset is the only source of data available for 
disabled individuals in Spain which is presented as a panel. However, the 
disadvantage of this kind of data relies on the fact that it does not cover all the 
population with a disabling condition (like surveys do), as it only includes 
disabled individuals who have worked (and contributed) at some point in their life 
and who have qualified to receive a disability pension.  
On the other hand, administrative data has the advantage of reducing the 
problems involved in self-reported measures of disability, which are commonly 
found in surveys. 
If we compare our results with the ones obtained in EDAD (survey on 
disabilities, deficiencies and health status), which was conducted in Spain in 1999 
and 2008, we can see that employment rates47 of self-reported disabled individuals 
are calculated to be 24% (16% for women and 32% for men) in 1999 and 27% (22% 
for women and 32% for men) in 2008. Both figures are higher than the ones we find 
in this chapter. This is quite reasonable if we take into account that there are many 
individuals that report having a disability in EDAD which will not qualify for 
receiving disability benefits (and will not be included in our sample) for two main 
reasons:  
                                                           
47 This is calculated for the population aged 16-64. 
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1. Their disability level does not reach the medical threshold to become 
a pensioner.   
2. They have not worked the required time to be eligible for the 
pension48.   
Therefore, we think that our results have to be taken with care and 
interpreted as only being representative of the population receiving a permanent 
disability pension and not representative of the whole population with some kind 
of disabling condition. 
3.7.2 Alternative policy measures 
The EDAD survey conducted in 2008 also allows us to explore a bit more the 
utilization of other policy measures that have been introduced to promote 
employment of disabled individuals in Spain. The survey is answered by 22.795 
disabled individuals (only 9055 below age 65), from which only 2669 are receiving 
a disability pension (29.5% of disabled persons below age 65).  
Table 16 shows that only 0.8% of respondents say that they have benefited 
from an employment quota for disabled individuals in the public sector and 0.68% 
in the private one.  
                                                           
48 The amount of contributory time required in order to be eligible for this type of benefits depends on 
the source of the disabling condition. If it is originated by an ordinary illness, eligibility to the pension 
requires having contributed 1/3 of the time between turning 20 and the appearance of the disabling 
condition, with a minimum of 5 years of contribution. There is no contributive requirement if the 
disability is caused by an accident (whether or not work-related or by a professional illness), but you 
need to have contributed. 
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Table 16 Selected results from EDAD survey 
 Total Men Women 
Percentage Working if ages 16-65 27% 
(2317) 
32% 
(1287) 
22% 
(1030) 
Are you currently working or did you work in your last 
job in a Special Centre for Disabled workers?   
1.7%  
(265) 
1.97% 
(148) 
1.44% 
(117) 
Are you working or did you work in your last job in a 
non-for-profit institution related to the disability sector? 
2.18% 
(341) 
2.36% 
(177) 
2.02% 
(164) 
Have you ever benefited from an employment quota for 
disabled individuals in a public sector? 
0.80% 
(125) 
0.85%  
(64) 
0.75% 
(61) 
Have you ever benefited from an employment quota for 
disabled individuals in the private sector? 
0.68% 
(106) 
0.89%  
(67) 
0.48% 
(39) 
Have you benefited from an employment contract specific 
for disabled persons? 
2.20% 
(344) 
2.81% 
(211) 
1.64% 
(133) 
Have you benefited from an incentive for employment or 
deductions to the Social Security contributions for 
disabled workers?  
0.84% 
(132) 
0.92%  
(69) 
0.77% 
(63) 
Have you benefited from any other mechanism or 
intervention targeted to promote access to employment for 
disabled people? 
1.07% 
(168) 
1.15% 
(86) 
1.01% 
(82) 
How did you find your current job (or the last job you 
had)? 
41.4% friend or family 
18.7% directly to the firm 
4.3% firm contacted him 
2.62% public employment 
service 
1.15% association people w/ 
disability 
Are you looking for a job? Only if age<65 10.16% (610) 
Why do you think you are not finding a job if you are 
looking for one? Only if age<65 
43.65% (of these 10%) because 
disability 
Why you are NOT looking for a job if age<65? (5157) 23.85% thinks it will be difficult 
to find a job as a disabled 
50% cannot work 
Have you felt discriminated because of your disability in 
your job in the last 12 months? 
9.42% (out of 2462) 
Have you felt discriminated to find a job because of your 
disability in the last 12 months? 
20.8% (out of 2462) 
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At the same time, only 2.20% of respondents say that they have benefited 
from an employment contract for disabled individuals, 0.84% report having 
benefited from a deduction to the Social Security contributions for disabled 
workers and 1.07% from another mechanism targeted to promote employment 
among disabled individuals49. 
Therefore, the incidence of these policy initiatives is rather small and, even if 
they are available, they seem to play a secondary role in determining employment 
probabilities for the disabled.  
3.8 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
The analysis above has filled in an important information gap as it has 
presented the first evaluation of an employment promotion policy for disabled 
individuals in Spain. We make use of the availability of a 12 year bracket in our 
dataset in order to investigate the employment effects for disabled women of the 
introduction of a policy reform in 2004 which increased the deductions to the 
Social Security contributions for employers who hired a disabled woman.  
In order to do so, we have first drawn a picture of a number of personal 
characteristics and of the labour market situation of disability pensioners in Spain 
and its evolution from 1996 to 2007. 
Our findings suggest that this type of reforms provide the right incentives to 
employers as they increase the probability of finding a job for disabled women in 
Spain. This kind of political incentive proves to go in the right direction for 
reversing the negative double discrimination problem that disabled women 
suffered in the Spanish labour market before the implementation of the policy in 
2004. 
The result that the policy increased employment for disabled women with 
respect to men appears to be pretty stable across the different estimation 
techniques that we have implemented in this chapter and this effect is particularly 
strong and significant for the younger group of individuals below age 45. The 
question still remains with regards to finding the best policy mechanism to obtain 
similar positive employment results for older groups of disabled individuals as 
results are not significant for individuals of more than 45 years old. We find that 
the policy is unable to increase employment prospects for older women, which 
constitute the majority group on the disability rolls. This result suggests that 
                                                           
49 Of course, these numbers are probably higher in reality as some of the respondents may not be aware 
(or may have forgotten) that the employer made use of one of these policies. 
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discrimination against older disabled women is a very persistent characteristic in 
the Spanish labour market as employers prove not to be willing to hire older 
disabled women even if there are incentives in place to do that. An alternative 
interpretation would suggest that the incentives in place are not enough to 
motivate employers to hire this older group of disabled women and that more 
incentives need to be introduced for the policy to be effective.    
Furthermore, the introduction of these measures should also be 
complemented by other labour market initiatives. The improvements provided by 
isolated policy measures are prone to be rather limited in size if they are not 
accompanied by a more comprehensive and far-reaching packet of measures. This 
is particularly important in countries like Spain, which exhibit very low 
employment rates of disabled workers. At the same time, utilization of all the 
available policy measures targeted to increase employment for disabled workers 
seems to be rather small and a biggest effort should be made from the 
administration to advertise and promote their use, as results from the EDAD 
survey show that there is room to improve employment prospects of disabled 
workers in Spain: 23.85% of the disabled do not look for a job because they think 
that it will be difficult for them to find one as a disabled worker and 43.65% of the 
disabled who are looking for a job think that they cannot find one because of the 
disability (see Table 16).  
Special employment centers that would support and guide the job search 
process of disabled workers could also bring good results as 41.4% of the disabled 
report having found their current or last job through a friend or family while 18.7% 
dealt directly with the firm and only 2.62% used a public employment service. 
As more updated databases become available, it will be interesting to assess 
the effects of more recent reforms as well as to evaluate the extent to which 
employment rates of disabled individuals have been affected by the economic 
crisis of 2008-2010. 
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3.9 Appendix: Tables and figures 
Covariates included:  
1) Characteristics of the individual and the pension:  
• Level of education: The education variable has 3 levels: The first 
one captures individuals who cannot read or write or who 
dropped out of education before finishing high school. The second 
one includes individuals holding a high school diploma (or 
equivalent) whereas the third one is for people with a bachelor’s 
degree and other higher education.  
• Age  
• Age at which he/she became disabled: even if we only have 
information on the characteristics of the pension from 1996, we do 
have an extra variable which captures the year in which the 
pension was granted. This is a very important piece of information 
as the age at which the individual became disabled proves to be a 
strong determinant of the labour market behavior of the individual 
during his/her disability spell. 
• Internal Immigrant: A dummy variable that is 1 if the province in 
which the individual lives is different from the province in which 
he/she was born. Therefore, we are only considering internal 
migration.   
• Amount of disability pension: There are 3 dummy variables 
capturing the amount of pension received by the individual in the 
last period (lagged values). Pension low is for values between 0-
500 euros/month, pension high for individuals receiving between 
500 and 1500 euro/month and pension top for amounts above 1500 
euro/month. 
• Regime of the pension: Dummy variables that identify the group of 
workers in which the individual has been included during his/her 
professional live: self-employed, agriculture (includes fishing and 
mining) and individuals that become disabled due to a work 
accident or professional sickness. The reference category excluded 
from the regressions is the general regime. 
• Regional fixed effects: dummies for each of the 17 CCAA50. 
                                                           
50 There are 19 Autonomous Communities (CCAA) in Spain. However, we include both Ceuta and 
Melilla inside Andalucia because these are two small cities in the north of Africa that do not have 
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• Town: is a dummy variable which is 1 if the town in which the 
individual lives (independently of the province or autonomous 
community) is smaller than 40.000 habitants. This variable 
captures spatial constraints affecting disabled individuals from 
small towns which make it more difficult for them to reach the 
Disability Evaluation Office, which are usually placed in the 
biggest cities of the province, or to find a job.    
2) Variables only affecting the type of pension: 
• Percentage of Disability Evaluation Offices: this variable is 
obtained by dividing the number of disability evaluation offices in 
each of the 52 provinces by the population in that province. We 
introduce this variable in order to capture differences between 
provinces in the service provided to disability claimants and to 
explore how these differences affect the probability of receiving a 
total or a partial type of pension. This variable will also be used as 
exclusion restriction as it has a clear effect on the type of pension 
diagnosed but it does not have an effect on the probability of 
disabled individuals to find a job. 
• Percentage of Disability Benefits granted: this variable is the result 
of dividing the number of benefits granted each year in each 
autonomous communities (17) divided by the population in each 
autonomous community. It describes the way (rigorous/flexible) in 
which the health conditions are evaluated in each region. As the 
previous one, this variable affects the type of pension that the 
individual receives but is not going to affect the probability of 
working for disabled individuals either.   
                                                                                                                                                    
enough observations to be included in the model as a separate variable. That is the reason why we only 
have 17 dummies for the CCAA. 
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Table 17: Probabilities of working and number of individuals in the sample 
 
Year Prob. 
Working 
Number of 
Individuals 
PrWork 
Women 
Number 
Ind. 
Women 
PrWork 
Men 
Number 
Ind. Men 
PrWork 
Partial 
Disab. 
Ind. Partial 
Disab. 
Benefits 
PrWork 
Total Dis. 
Pens 
1996 0.0377 19961 0.0164 5279 0.0453 14682 0.0558 11825 0.0113 
1997 0.0422 20259 0.0158 5348 0.0516 14911 0.0632 12216 0.0101 
1998 0.0673 20803 0.0205 5505 0.0842 15298 0.1021 12565 0.0143 
1999 0.0732 21530 0.0244 5776 0.0911 15754 0.1118 12954 0.0149 
2000 0.0818 22293 0.0274 6075 0.1021 16218 0.1253 13428 0.0159 
2001 0.0876 23140 0.0304 6402 0.1095 16738 0.1365 13886 0.0148 
2002 0.0922 24121 0.0343 6839 0.1151 17282 0.1434 14324 0.0173 
2003 0.096 25443 0.0383 7448 0.1198 17995 0.1488 15147 0.0182 
2004 0.098 26978 0.0395 8082 0.1229 18896 0.1540 15892 0.0176 
2005 0.101 28064 0.0424 8576 0.1268 19488 0.1606 16418 0.0171 
2006 0.105 30037 0.0449 9388 0.1323 20649 0.1683 17520 0.0164 
2007 0.1163 31737 0.0554 10099 0.1447 21638 0.1859 18438 0.0198 
Table 18 Rules for the determination of the pension amount 
 PDP TDP 
Depends on the contributions in the last job (salary in the last job) 
Regulatory Base Depends on the source of the disability: common illness, non-work 
accident or working accident (or professional illness) 51. 
Depends on age of the individual: 
55% if <55 years old 
75% if >55 years old & no job 
100%  
Percentage applied to 
Regulatory Base Depends on the source of the disability: if working accident (or 
professional illness), 30%-50% more if employer broke safety regulations 
for the job52. 
Income Taxes Pay normal income taxes  Exempted if Basc53 country & no job 
Exempted from income taxes 
Reduction in 
employment income 
used to calculate the 
income tax 
2.800 euros/year  (if disability level 
between 33% and 65%) if working 
6.200 euros (if disability more than 65% 
or below that but disabled with reduced 
mobility) if working 
 
 
                                                           
51 In our database we don’t observe the source of the disability, we only observe the regulatory base. 
52 Please note that in the case of a TDP, the final percentage applied could be more than 100% of the 
regulatory base if the employer is found guilty of not preserving the required safety conditions for the 
job and has to pay between a 30%-50% increase in the percentage of the regulatory base (over the 100% 
already established for TDP benefits). 
53 Disabled individuals in the provinces of Vizcaya, Alava and Guipuzcoa, which constitute the Basc 
country, are exempted of paying income taxes on Total Disability Benefits if they don’t work. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Disabled individuals have incomes which are on average almost 15 percent 
lower than the rest of the population in developed Western economies and only 70 
percent of the mean in the United States (OECD 2009). This is despite a very 
substantial documented increase in disability insurance (DI) availability and 
generosity in recent decades (Autor and Duggan, 2006; OECD, 2003). The cost of 
expanding this protection program has so far been outweighed by the sustained 
economic growth of the past twenty years54. With the fallouts of the financial crisis 
on government spending limitations, the burden of DI on the public purse will 
certainly come under renewed criticism. The recurring principal argument for 
reform of the disability benefit system has however not been its cost but rather its 
potential perverse incentive on the labour market participation (LMP) of certain 
groups of individuals.  
The relationship between DI availability and generosity and LMP is an 
intrinsically difficult question to answer. The main criterion for eligibility is 
broadly always defined as having a physical or mental impairment that prevents a 
person from engaging in substantial gainful activity. This shows how the selection 
process into DI is strongly based on an individual having low LMP probability, 
making the claim and work decisions highly endogenous. Any evaluation of a 
disability benefit program must therefore carefully deal with this endogeneity 
issue in order not to over-estimate its impact on the labour market behaviour of 
recipients. There is now an influential literature exploring this relationship using 
various methodological approaches to the problem and we review it in the next 
section of this chapter. The almost universal consensus is that DI has a very 
negative effect on the attachment to the labour market of eligible claimants. The 
remaining debate seems to be mostly about the size of this effect.  
Autor and Duggan (2007, 200855) are among the few that have recently 
focused on better understanding the mechanisms behind the behavioral response 
of DI claimants. Their main argument is that it could be due not only to the usually 
put forward distortionary substitution effect on incentives but also to a non-
distortionary income effect. The latter interpretation would imply that the 
observed reduction in labour supply is not a deadweight loss and it is providing 
                                                           
54 Despite increases in the number of claimants and of the average generosity of these benefits, the good 
economic performance of the economy has meant that the cost of DI has remained stable since the early 
1990s in OECD countries  at around 1.3 percent of GDP over this period 
55 We would like to thank these authors for making their 2008 unpublished report to the Social Security 
Administration available to us.   
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the right amount of transfer income in order for disabled individuals not to have to 
work above their substantial gainful activity level. These authors have attempted 
to empirically measure the importance of the income effect channel on LMP by 
using one of the few such DI programs in the USA which is not provided elusively 
on a work-contingent basis (Agent Orange). Their findings suggest a large income 
effect on near elderly males but are only tentative because of data limitations. We 
propose here to investigate this issue by exploiting certain unique features of the 
DI system in Spain. 
The Spanish insurance system for disabled individuals is first characterized 
by a low and relatively stable recipiency rate by international standards56. Those 
who are eligible then receive monthly transfers which are fixed at a certain 
proportion of their wage level prior to the disability (i.e. it is a contributory 
insurance scheme57) and is secure until moving to retirement pension at age 65. 
This proportion is 55 percent for partial disability and 100 percent for total 
disability. Crucially the benefit amount is not contingent on not having 
employment income and has even built in taxation mechanisms to make LMP 
advantageous while on DI. Another interesting feature of the Spanish system is 
that certain claimants of partial disability benefits are eligible to a 36 percent 
increase when they turn 55 years old (the proportion increases from 55 to 75%). 
This is granted to DI recipients with lower skill level and exposed to local labour 
market conditions which are deemed to make it difficult for them to find 
employment. The 75 percent replacement rate is granted to just under two thirds of 
partial disability claimants over the age threshold and close to none before that. 
This particularity enables us to investigate the impact of this large increase in DI 
generosity on employment of near elderly individuals using a regression 
discontinuity approach. 
We use a large representative sample of the Spanish population receiving 
disability benefits for which we have monthly administrative data on work and 
benefit history between 1996 and 2007. We focus our attention on partial disability 
recipients who are aged between 51 and 58 and are able to identify the individuals 
who are treated with the DI increase. Because of selection on low employment 
probability, naïve OLS estimates of the treatment effect logically generate huge 
policy impacts (-17 percent) even after controlling for observable characteristics. 
Augmenting the model with the inclusion of individual fixed effects yields a policy 
impact almost three times smaller. Our regression discontinuity (RD) approach 
                                                           
56 Only 4 percent of the population aged 20 to 64 receives disability benefits in Spain compared to an 
OECD average of 6 percent, which is the same number than in the United States.  
57 There is also a non-contributory disability benefits system but it is comparatively smaller in size 
(205.319 people received non-contributory disability benefits in Spain in 2007 as opposed to 868.026 that 
receive contributory disability benefits). We do not include the group of non-contributory pensioners in 
our analysis. 
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first considers different age windows around the 55 years threshold. These results 
suggest that the increase in DI generosity is at least responsible for a 3 percentage 
points decrease in employment. However, when we run some tests about the 
linearity of covariates around the eligibility age threshold, we can see that age at 
which individuals start claiming DI is not continuous. This result can be 
interpreted as evidence that the benefit increase accelerates the entry rate into the 
disability rolls of individuals aged 55 or over. Therefore, we proceed by estimating 
a new RD model but with a sample restricted to individuals who start receiving DI 
benefits before reaching age 55. Now results suggest that the policy prompts a 1 
percentage point decrease in employment probability, which is translated into an 8 
percent reduction in employment probability (as the average employment rate for 
this sample is 12.5 percent).  
We believe that these results are very much in line with the findings from 
previous research on this subject (specially results from Gruber, 2000) and claim 
that, considering the features of the Spanish system in terms of the benefit not 
being contingent on working status, the observed impacts of DI on employment 
may be mainly due to an income effect, in line with was is argued in Autor and 
Duggan (2007, 2008). 
 The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview 
of the related literature on the impact of DI on employment. Section 3 discusses the 
disability benefit system in Spain and the increase in DI generosity program. 
Section 4 describes the data and gives some descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents 
the methodology. Section 6 reports and discusses the results and the final section 
concludes.   
4.2 Related Literature 
Much of the literature on work disincentives of permanent disability benefits 
is based on the analysis of the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program 
in the USA. 
Labour force participation rates for older males in the USA have been falling 
during the last three decades and an extensive body of research has emerged that 
tries to link this evolution with the growth of the disability insurance program. The 
argument is based on the high implicit marginal tax rate on earnings above a 
threshold ($940/month in 2008) that is part of the eligibility criteria in order to be 
accepted to the disability program58. It is widely accepted that the current design of 
                                                           
58 Applicants to the disability insurance system in the USA need to demonstrate that they did not work 
during the five months prior to the application and once they start receiving the benefits they cannot 
gain more than the threshold defined by the substantial gainful activity (SGA which was $940 per 
month in 2008). However, since 1960 disability recipients have access to a Trial Work Period in which, 
99 
 
the program creates disincentives to work for disabled individuals but there is still 
disagreement on the magnitude of these effects and their contribution to the 
decrease in labour force participation of older Americans. 
The main problem encountered when trying to estimate the size of the 
disincentives to work resulting from the disability insurance system is the 
endogeneity of the receipt of disability benefits in a labour force participation 
equation. Therefore, in order to get unbiased results, researchers have tried to use 
an exogenous variation in the level of benefits or to rely on econometric techniques 
that can account for this endogeneity. 
In this line of research, Bound (1989) compares a sample of rejected and 
accepted DI beneficiaries and estimates that the counterfactual labour force 
participation rate of disability recipients would have been 30 percentage points 
higher if they wouldn’t have received the benefits. The validity of his estimates 
relies on the assumption that both groups are relatively similar in observed and 
unobserved characteristics although he recognizes that rejected applicants are 
usually somewhat healthier than accepted applicants so that he defends that his 
estimates represent an “upper bound” of the potential labour force participation of 
DI receivers.  
Using a similar approach, a more recent study by Chen and Van Der Klaauw 
(2008) focuses on the impact of the receipt of disability benefits for marginal 
applicants for which access to the disability system is only decided in a second 
stage of the eligibility process and on the basis of vocational and age factors. 
Individuals that reach this second stage have been found to fulfill the medical 
impairment required in the first stage of the eligibility process and case workers 
use a grid of individual characteristics of the disabled worker such as age, 
education and past work experience in order to determine “the individual’s 
residual functional capacity to perform work-related physical and mental 
activities”. For age, the cutoff points are set at 45, 50 and 55 years old and the 
authors use the discontinuity in DI award rates at these points to estimate the effect 
of benefit receipt on labour supply. Their findings suggest that the receipt of 
disability benefits reduce labour force participation by 6-12 percentage points and 
labour supply by 16-20 hours per month. However, the question remains to 
whether this result can be extrapolated to the whole population of disability 
benefit recipients as calculations are only done with individuals that reach the 
second stage of the benefits adjudication process who are also probably the ones 
with a relatively better health among the pool of disability recipients. 
                                                                                                                                                    
for 5 years, they can accumulate up to nine months of work above the SGA. If they earn more than the 
SGA for more than nine months, benefits are terminated (Maestas and Yin, 2008). 
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Maestas and Yin (2008) take a difference approach and exploit the fact that, 
once disabled individuals reach the Full Retirement Age (FRA), disability benefits 
are automatically converted to old-age pension. Since the year 2000, this change 
abolishes the working restriction embedded in the US disability system so that the 
tax on earnings disappears while the benefit amount remains the same. They 
calculate changes in labour force participation as DI beneficiaries move to old-age 
benefits and using a difference-in-difference approach get an estimate of 10.4 
percentage points rise in labour force participation at full retirement age among 
former DI beneficiaries relative to non-DI participants. However, this number is 
calculated using a sub-population and it cannot be generalized to the whole 
population in the disability rolls as labour force participation naturally decreases 
with age. For that reason, the authors conclude that this number represents a 
“lower bound” estimate on the potential work capacity of individuals in the 
disability system (Maestas and Yin, 2008). 
Apart from evidence for the United States, there are two more important 
studies that focus on Canadian data. The study by Gruber (2000) makes use of an 
increase of 36% in the level of disability benefits in all Canadian regions except 
Quebec introduced in 1987 in order to estimate an elasticity of labour force non-
participation of 0.28-0.36 with respect to disability insurance benefits. Or course, 
his identification strategy relies on the exogenous variation in benefit amounts 
between the two regions, which assumes no correlation between the change in 
benefits and other differential labour market trends in the two regions. Another 
study by Hyatt (1996) focuses on Canadian data (Ontario) and uses a Heckman 
selection model to estimate the effect of permanent disability benefits on post-
injury wages accounting for the self-selection of individuals into the employment 
option. Hyatt proves that the generosity of worker’s permanent disability benefits 
is negatively associated with post-injury employment.  
In an attempt to summarize the results and to raise the attention of both 
governments and the general public opinion about the distortions introduced by 
the relatively generous disability systems, the OECD calculated the disincentive 
effects to work using the “disability benefits net replacement rates59” for average 
earners which were estimated to be 39% in Australia, between 43-60% in the UK, 
74% in Luxembourg and 64%-84% in the case of partial disability holders in Spain 
(121% in the case of full disability). Additionally, in a companion report published 
in 2003 also by the OECD, a “benefit generosity indicator” was constructed and 
proved to have a positive correlation with both beneficiary rates and disability 
benefit inflows (OECD, 2003). Therefore, the literature in the European context has, 
for some time, accepted that disability systems in Europe are not only used for 
                                                           
59 Net replacement rates compare the income situation when moving from paid work to receiving 
disability benefits without working (OECD, 2007a). 
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persons with health incapacities but also as an alternative pathway into early 
retirement or as uncovered unemployment, particularly for the case of older 
individuals. As a result, countries have focused on the introduction of reforms to 
activate disabled individuals and to substitute the disincentives by incentives to 
take up a job for disability benefit recipients. Consequently, most of the latest 
literature relative to the European disability systems consists of policy evaluations 
of these reforms60.  
For the particular case of Spain, a number of papers have tried to identify 
the extent to which disability benefits have been used as an alternative exit from 
the labour market for disabled individuals: Blanco (2000) uses a competing risk 
model to identify the characteristics that affect older individuals when leaving 
employment to enter early retirement or disability  benefits while in chapter 2 of 
this book we focus on the effects of the business cycle on older workers going into 
disability benefits, unemployment or inactivity. Malo (2007) and chapter 3 of this 
book focus on the factors that influence the low employment rates of disabled 
individuals and the later chapter also finds positive but small effects of an 
employment promotion policy introduced in 2004 to foster the integration of 
disabled women in the labour market (an increase in the deductions to the Social 
Security contributions offered to employers that hire a disabled women). However, 
none of the literature in Spain has tried to estimate the disincentives to work 
provided by the level of disability benefits awarded. 
4.3 The Disability Insurance System in Spain 
4.3.1 Types of disability benefits 
In Spain, permanent contributive disability insurance is defined as the economic 
benefits that aim at compensating the individual for losing a certain amount of 
wage or professional earnings when the person is affected by a reduction or a 
complete loss of his/her working ability in a way that is assumed to be permanent 
due to the effects of a pathologic or traumatic process derived from an illness or an 
accident61.  
                                                           
60 Examples of these evaluations are Humer et al. (2007) and Lalive et al. (2009) for Austria, Duell et al. 
(2009) for Norway, Stafford et al. (2006) and Corden et al. (2001) for the U.K., reports from the 
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (2005) and from the Department of Family and 
Community Services (2003) for Australia, Van Ours (2006) for The Netherlands or Hartmann (2006) for 
Luxembourg, among others.  
61 Own translation of the definition of permanent disability given by the Spanish Social Security 
administration at www.seg-social.es.  
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In order to capture the different situations in which a person can be after 
suffering from a disabling condition, the Spanish Social Security administration 
differentiates between three main degrees of disability62 that depend on the 
amount of working capacity that has been lost: 
 (i) Partial Disability:  Individuals suffering from the kind of impairment that 
disables the individual to develop all or the fundamental tasks of his/her usual job 
or professional activity but the individual is still capable of developing a different 
job or professional activity. 
(ii) Total Disability: Individuals suffering from the kind of impairment that 
disables the individual for the development of any kind of job or professional 
activity. 
(ii) Severe Disability: Individuals who are in a situation in which, as a result of 
anatomic or functional loses, the individual needs the assistance of a third person 
to develop the most essential acts of live such as eating, moving, etc… 
Therefore, the degree of disability in which the individual is classified is 
set in relation to the working capacity lost as the goal of the benefits is to 
compensate for the reduction on wages or professional earnings caused by the 
disabling condition. The procedure of applying for permanent disability benefits 
can be initiated by the provincial office of the National Institute of Social Security 
(NISS), by the institutions that collaborate in the process (such as hospitals), or by 
the individual himself (in which case, more documentation is required). The 
evaluation is done by the Disabilities Evaluation Team which analyses the medical 
report prepared by doctors in the provincial office of the NISS and the report 
explaining the professional background of the person. The Disabilities Evaluation 
Team writes a report that will be evaluated by the directors of the provincial office 
of the NISS in order to take a decision on the type of disability pension granted (if 
any), the benefit level and the date of the next planned revision to check whether 
there has been an improvement or an aggravation of the condition. Similarly, any 
revision of the disability degree or pension amount is done by the provincial office 
of the NISS. A graphical description of the process is provided in Figure 34 of the 
appendix. 
4.3.2 Elegibility and Pension Amount 
As we are dealing with contributory benefits, there are a number of rules in 
terms of eligibility requirements that the individual has to fulfill in order to qualify 
for the pension. These requirements as well as the pension amount vary depending 
                                                           
62 These three levels of disability represented 99.6 percent of permanent contributory DI claimants in 
2007. A remaining 0.4 percent of claimants received a lump sum payment for every minor disability.  
103 
 
on the source of the disability, which can be an ordinary illness, a work-unrelated 
accident or a work-related accident or professional illness. In the case of an 
ordinary illness, eligibility to the pension requires having contributed 1/3 of the 
time between turning 20 years old and the appearance of the disabling condition, 
with a minimum of 5 years of contributions63. There is no contributive requirement 
when the disability is caused by an accident, whether or not work-related, or a 
professional illness. 
The total amount of the pension is obtained from multiplying a percentage, 
which varies depending on the type of pension, to the regulatory base, which 
depends on the source of the disability and on previous salaries. The regulatory 
base of the pension in the case of an ordinary illness is computed as the average 
wage of the last 8 years of work. For a work-unrelated accident, is the average 
annual wage over a period of 24 consecutive months chosen by the person within 
the last 7 years of work. For work-related accident or professional illness, it is the 
average wage in the last year of work.  
The percentage applied to the regulatory base is 55% under the Partial 
Disability regime, 100% under the Total Disability scheme and 100% plus another 
50% to cover for the person that is taking care of the disabled in the case of Severe 
Disability. However, for partial disability pensioners, this 55% can be increased by 
36% for individuals who are older than 55 years old and “as a result of their lack of 
education/preparation and the social and labour market conditions of the region 
where they live, it is assumed that it will be difficult for them to find a job”. 
Therefore, individuals in the Partial Disability scheme that comply with these 
requirements can receive a 75% of the regulatory base instead of a 55%. All 
permanent disability benefits are automatically converted to old-age benefits once 
the individual turns 65 years old. 
In terms of income taxes, Partial Disability benefits are taxable under the 
general income tax rules and Total disability benefits are always exempted from 
income taxes. Furthermore, if the individual works while receiving the pension, 
there is a reduction in the employment income used to calculate the income tax of 
2.800 euros/year if their degree of disability is low (between 33% and 65%) or 6.200 
if the disability level is higher (more than 65%) or if the disabled has reduced 
mobility. All this legislation can be translated in the following equations for 
recipients of Partial Disability benefits:  
 
 
                                                           
63 If the individual is younger than 31 when becoming disabled, the requirement is to have contributed 
for 1/3 of the time between turning 16 years old and the appearance of the disabling condition with no 
minimum of years required. 
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Partial Disability without a job:      
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(Equation 14) 
 
Where pi is the regulatory base of the pension amount that depends on the 
contributions in the last job (salary) and on the source of the disability64, t is an 
indicator function for treatment and a is age. 
Partial Disability with a job:  
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(Equation 16) 
Where di is the degree of disability, k(di) is the reduction to the income 
considered for tax purposes, r is the income tax rate applied and c × di  is the cost of 
working (in monetary terms) for a disabled individual which is a linear function of 
his/her degree of disability. 
For this chapter, our interest lies on the evaluation of the disincentives to 
work caused by the increase in the pension amount at age 55. For this reason, we 
are restricting our analysis to disabled individuals in the Partial Disability scheme 
where the law applies.  
4.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
4.4.1 The Data 
The study will use the Continuous Sample of Working Lives (“Muestra 
Continua de Vidas Laborales”, MCVL) which is a microeconomic data set based on 
administrative records provided by the Spanish Social Security Administration. It 
                                                           
64 We take it as a value; we don’t calculate it as everybody in the sample receives always a pension and 
it would be very difficult to calculate because we don’t know the source of the disability. 
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contains a random sample of 4% of all the individuals who, at some point during 
2007, had contributed towards the social security system (either by working or 
being in an unemployment scheme) or had received a contributory DI (disability 
insurance). The random sample selected contains over one million individuals. 
It contains information on the entire monthly employment and benefit 
history of the workers, including the exact duration of employment, 
unemployment and disability benefit spells, and for each spell, several variables 
that describe the characteristics of the job or the unemployment/disability benefits. 
There is also some information on personal characteristics such as age, gender, 
nationality and level of education. We also capture the economic business cycle by 
compiling quarterly unemployment rates at the province level (there are 52 
provinces in Spain). 
We select in our sample all individuals who are aged 51-58 and are receiving 
a Partial disability pension at some point between 1996 and 2007. The final sample 
for our analysis contains 623,228 monthly observations for 14,692 individuals. 
4.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
About a third of the claimants in our sample are women (4,708) which is relatively 
large but follows the recent trends in the increase in the female to mail ratio among 
disability benefit recipients. The education level of these DI (disability insurance) 
claimants is low with only about 30 percent having completed at least secondary 
education. This is not surprising since we are focusing on older workers which 
have on average less schooling but also because disability is likely to be correlated 
to education, as it is likely to generate differences in health investment. Almost 18 
percent of the individuals in our sample (2,592) have worked at some point while 
they were claiming Partial Disability benefits. This is relatively high considering 
that this is only about half the employment rate of non disabled workers of the 
same age group in Spain over this period.  
Our methodological approach (described below) relies on the discontinuity in 
the 36 percent increase of DI (DII; disability insurance increase) at age 55 which is a 
criterion for selection into the program. We show in Figure 28 that the proportion 
of individuals treated does dramatically jump after individuals reach this age 
threshold. There also appears to be a very small number of individuals who 
receive the DII before being 55 which may reflect some level of administrative 
error or cheating by disability case workers. Still the difference in treatment is very 
large, about 60 percent, and does warrant evaluation using a fuzzy regression 
discontinuity design. 
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Figure 28 Proportion of disability recipients receiving the increase in disability benefits by age. 
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Figure 29 Proportion of disabled individuals who are female in the sample by age. 
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Source:  Own calculations from the sample of the MCVL database. 
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Figure 30 Proportion of disabled individuals with secondary education or above. 
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We check that the treatment discontinuity is not a result of differences in 
covariates around the age threshold graphically. Figure 29 shows that women 
constantly represent approximately one third of our sample of claimants 
throughout. In Figure 30 we must first note that older individuals are on average 
less educated. But the graph is reassuring and shows that this criterion for 
eligibility to the benefit increase appears to be very smooth around the age 
threshold. The pattern for age started claiming DI in Figure 31 has an increasing 
shape, with older benefit recipients having on average entered DI older. The 
distribution of average age started claiming DI still appears to be relatively smooth 
around the eligibility threshold but we will check whether the small jump at age 55 
is significant or not in a more systematic way in our statistical analysis. 
Finally we plot the changes in our outcome of interest, employment status, by 
age in Figure 32. Again we see that the detachment from employment increases 
from age 52 onwards as our sampled individuals become older65. We also note 
what appears to be a small discontinuity around the threshold which could be 
resulting from the change in treatment probability. The significance of this gap is 
however difficult to judge graphically and will be confirmed or otherwise in our 
statistical model estimates.  
                                                           
65 The marked drop in EMP at age 52 onward is still relatively puzzling to us since there are no 
disability insurance entitlement changes at this age. It could be due to the ‘natural’ effect of age on EMP 
as claimants become older and we therefore carefully control for this phenomenon in our statistical 
analysis.  
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Figure 31 Age started claiming DI by age 
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Figure 32 EMP of disability recipients by age. 
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Source:  Own calculations from the sample of the MCVL database.  
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4.5   Methodology 
4.5.1 OLS and Fixed Effect Models 
For individual i in month t, a simple statistical model relating EMP 
(employment, our outcome of interest) to DII participation (the policy treatment) 
can be written as: 
ititit uAgeDIIEMP +++= )(δβα  
(Equation 17) 
where α is an intercept, EMP is a dummy variable for working or not, DII a 
dummy variable for receiving the disability benefit increase and u is an error term. 
We control for the age in months of the claimants in quadratic form, δ(Age), since 
we have observed in Figure 32 that is negatively correlated to EMP. If assignment 
to DII treatment was random, then β would be an unbiased estimator of the impact 
of DII on EMP. 
However, the definition of having a low EMP probability for DII selection 
makes it non-random and so a regression estimate from (Equation 17) will be 
biased – overestimating the decreases in employment rates due to the program. 
One possible means to deal with this is to augment (Equation 17) by adding 
observable characteristics of claimants to amend the equation as:  
ititkikitit uURXAgeDIIEMP +++++= γδβα )(  
(Equation 18) 
Where k individual characteristic are included in the vector of control 
variables, X, and UR is the unemployment rate the claimant is exposed to in the 
area where he resides in month t. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimate of β 
is then the relationship between EMP and DII holding constant the X’s and 
controlling for labour market conditions66.   
  Since we have panel data information on the treatment and employment 
status of disability benefit claimants we can include individual fixed effects, αi, as 
follows: 
                                                           
66 We use the unemployment rate to control for labour market characteristics rather than month and 
year dummies since these would be highly correlated with the age (in months) control that we include 
in the model.  
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itititiit uURAgeDIIEMP ++++= )(δβα  
(Equation 19) 
The individual characteristics, Xs, from (Equation 18) are now dropped since 
they do not vary over time. Our interpretation of the estimated β is that it should 
now be free of observed and unobserved claimant characteristics. Still, if selection 
into DII and EMP is dependent on factors not included in equation (Equation 19) 
the selection problem remains.  Since the rule for DII selection is that claimants 
must be over 55 years old, we consider another methodology which should be 
better in addressing the discussed selection problem: Regression Discontinuity. 
4.5.2 Regression Discontinuity Models 
Regression Discontinuity (RD) design has had a long history in statistics, but has 
recently gained prominence among economists for its potential for dealing with 
the problem of unobservable characteristics alongside its conceptual simplicity67. 
This method can only be applied when there exists a cut-off point of an assignment 
variable Z above and below which there is a strong difference in treatment 
probability. As we clearly illustrated in Figure 28, this is the case for DII treatment 
depending on age of the claimant (Z) due to the 55 years minimum selection rule.   
A widely researched and very intuitive example of RD occurs for the 50 
percent cut-off rule for winning or losing an election. The argument is that 
different units (areas, firms) which have had very close votes around the cut-off are 
likely to be very similar in observed and unobserved characteristics. Still they will 
have opposite outcomes whether they were above or below the assignment cut-off, 
making it very simple to compare the difference in impact of selection or not. In 
this case, an unbiased treatment effect on outcome, here EMP, with subscripts + 
and – indicating proximity to either side of the threshold can be written as: 
  
−+
−= EMPEMPβ  
(Equation 20) 
It is extremely simple to estimate β here since being above the cut-off 
guarantees treatment and we only have to compare the means of the outcome 
around that point. This is called a sharp RD as the probability of treatment, or 
inclusion into a program, jumps from 0 to 1 on either side of the cut-off. 
                                                           
67 For a clear and detailed discussion on the RD methodology, see for example Imbens and Lemieux 
(2008). 
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In the case of DII treatment, as in many other programs, the change in the 
probability of treatment around the assignment variable threshold is not so sharp 
but does greatly increase. This type of set up is called a fuzzy RD and it is still 
possible to exploit the discontinuity to identify a treatment effect68.  In this case 
however the difference in outcomes around the cut-off will be a function of the 
difference in the jump in the proportion treated around this point. Mathematically, 
using average EMP, the mean proportion of claimants receiving DII, and the 
subscript + and – as before, we can write )( −+−+ −=− DIIDIIEMPEMP β . 
This can be re-written as the RD estimator: 
−+
−+
−
−
=
DIIDII
EMPEMPβ  
(Equation 21) 
 
If it is the case that claimants just below and just above the age cut-off do 
have similar characteristics (observable and unobservable) then the estimator in 
(Equation 21) can legitimately be used to estimate the causal impact of DII on EMP. 
This is because it simply compares the difference in employment rates of 
individuals which have been randomly assigned around an assignment threshold 
and which should consequently have similar characteristics. Of course since not all 
claimants over 55 receive the benefit increase, this must be scaled by the difference 
in the jump in the proportion of individuals that are treated around this point.  
We can estimate β using different + and - windows in terms of age on each 
side of the threshold. As the age difference of individuals around the threshold 
becomes smaller we expect the RD estimate of DII treatment to decrease since 
claimants on either side will be ever more similar in observed (and unobserved) 
characteristics. A more robust test of this similarity is to include individual 
characteristics of our claimants as controls when obtaining RD estimates of DII on 
EMP in the smallest age window available. If these characteristics are randomly 
distributed around the age threshold, we expect that including controls will not 
significantly change the RD estimates. But if they become significantly different 
with the inclusion of certain individual trait of DI claimants, it will suggest that we 
must consider how this affects the validity of our RD estimates. 
                                                           
68 In our case we are actually facing what has been referred to as a ‘partially fuzzy’ by Battistin and 
Rettore (2008) or a ‘simple special case’ by Blundell and Costa Dias (2009) version of the RD methodology. 
This is because treatment is only available but not mandatory on one side of the threshold. Both of these 
papers highlight the advantage of this approach relative to the standard fuzzy RDD.  
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4.6 Results 
The results from the OLS, columns (1) to (3), and fixed effect estimates, 
columns (4) and (5), of DII on EMP are reported in Table 19. The simple OLS 
estimate including a quadratic term in age is very large and only slightly smaller 
when controlling for individual characteristics (gender, education, age started 
claiming disability). Also taking into account changes in labour market conditions 
by including provincial unemployment rates does not change the estimated impact 
of 17 percent of the policy on employment participation. This large effect was to be 
expected considering that selection for DII is contingent on having a low EMP 
probability. The fixed effect estimates are much smaller and suggest that the 
program only reduces the probability of working by 6 percent. We believe this to 
be a superior estimate of the DII impact to the OLS one since it measures the 
average effect of switching from non-treatment to treatment in terms of changes in 
EMP for the same individuals. As we explained above we may still be concerned 
that individual fixed effects and labour market conditions cannot account for the 
endogenous nature of selection for treatment of a claimant and her behavioral 
response. For this we turn to the RD analysis.  
 Table 20 reports RD estimates for four different age windows (from +/- 4 
years to +/- 1 year) around the 55 year threshold. The discontinuity in DII is clearly 
important and represents a jump of between 50 and 60 in the proportion of treated 
claimants. The difference in EMP is significant and between 5.1 and 1.6 percentage 
points lower after the age cut-off. The RD coefficients are the ratios of these 
differences and they are all statistically significant69. However it is clear that the 
impact of DII on EMP becomes much smaller as the age window around the 
threshold is reduced as the individuals in our sample become ever more similar. A 
straightforward RD methodology therefore suggests that an increase in DI 
generosity reduces work probability by, at least, 3 percentage points.  
                                                           
69 As the estimate is similar to a local IV estimate of DII on EMP instrumented by a claimant being older 
than the cut-off age, we are able to obtain standard errors as recommended by Hahn et al. (2001) 
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Table 19 OLS and fixed effects results 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
          Employment Status   
 OLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Disability Benefit Bonus 
(DBB) 
-.187 
(.001) 
-.170 
(.001) 
-.170 
(.001) 
-.060 
(.001) 
-.060 
(.001) 
Age/Age2/Age3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Controls No Yes Yes No No 
Unemployment Rate   No No Yes No Yes 
Individual Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 623,228 623,228 623,288 623,288 623,288 
Number of Individuals 14,692 14,692 14,692 14,692 14,692 
Note:  Age is in month; Age2 and Age3 are respectively the square and cube of  the 
difference from the mean Age. The Individual Controls are: gender; secondary school 
completion;  and age start claiming disabil ity benefits .  The Unemployment  Rate is 
quarterly for the 51 Spanish administrative regions.   
Table 20 RD results for different age windows around the eligibility age threshold. 
Estimation on Individuals 
Aged 55 and +/- 4, 3, 2 and 1Year 
 
  
 
All 
Ages 
+/- 3 
Years 
+/- 2 
Years 
+/- 1 
Years 
Discontinuity of DII Treatment Around Threshold 
(DII+– DII- ) 
.612 
(.001) 
.595 
(.001) 
.567 
(.001) 
.517 
(.002) 
Difference in EMP Around  
Threshold (EMP+– EMP- ) 
-.051 
(.001) 
-.041 
(.001) 
-.030 
(.001) 
-.016 
(.002) 
Estimated Effect of DII on EMP 
Participation              (EMP+–EMP-)/ (DII+– DII- ) 
-.084 
(.001) 
-.070 
(.002) 
-.052 
(.002) 
-.031 
(.003) 
Number of Observations 632,228 463,438 306,460 151,904 
Number of Individuals 14,692 12,424 10,314 8,313 
114 
 
In Table 21 we report RD estimates which include DI claimant individual 
characteristics for the 55 years old +/-1 year sample. The second and third columns 
of results show that the inclusion of gender and secondary education completion 
dummies does not significantly change the estimated impact of the DI increase on 
EMP which remains roughly -.03. However, the inclusion of the age at which 
individuals started claiming disability benefits generates an RD estimate three 
times smaller. This suggests that this covariate is not linearly distributed around 
the eligibility age threshold although this was not graphically obvious from Figure 
31. We may, for example, worry that the benefit generosity increase incites a 
number of individuals to start claiming DI after turning 55 and have low EMP 
probabilities (i.e. the new higher replacement rate is enough for them to use DI as a 
form of early retirement). 
Table 21 RD results +/-1 year around eligibility age threshold with individual controls. 
Estimation on Individuals 
Aged 55 and +/- 1Year 
 
  
 
Discontinuity of DII Treatment Around Threshold 
(DII+– DII- ) 
.517 
(.002) 
.517 
(.002) 
.517 
(.002) 
.508 
(.002) 
Difference in EMP Around  
Threshold (EMP+– EMP- ) 
-.016 
(.002) 
-.016 
(.002) 
-.015 
(.001) 
-.006 
(.002) 
Estimated Effect of DII on EMP 
Participation (EMP+–EMP-)/ (DII+– DII- ) 
-.031 
(.003) 
-.030 
(.003) 
-.029 
(.002) 
-.011 
(.003) 
Proportion Female No Yes Yes Yes 
Proportion with Secondary Education No No Yes Yes 
Age Started Claiming Disability No No No Yes 
Number of Observations 151,904 151,904 151,904 151,904 
Number of Individuals 8,313 8,313 8,313 8,313 
 
Figure 33 plots the proportion of claimants who entered DI at different ages in our 
sample. We do find here that there appears to be a substantial acceleration in the 
proportion of new entries of individuals aged 55 or older into DI. This cannot be 
entirely explained by the natural increase of probability to claim DI with age. The 
jump in entry rates between ages 54 to 55 is substantial and we must therefore 
conclude to an important entry effect into DI of increasing the generosity of 
benefits available. To obtain an impact of DII on EMP net of entry effects, we 
restrict our sample to individuals who started claiming disability benefits before 
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age 55. We report our RD estimates for the +/- 1 year window including individual 
characteristic controls for this sample in Table 22. We first note that our RD 
estimates are robust to the inclusion of claimant individual characteristics 
suggesting that observed (and unobserved) characteristics of claimants around the 
threshold are linearly distributed for this sample. We therefore conclude that the 
net impact of DII is to reduce by 8 percent employment probability7071.  
Figure 33 Distribution of age started claiming DI. 
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70 The average EMP for this sample is of 12.5 percent and thus a 1 percentage point decrease 
corresponds to an 8 percent drop in employment probability.  
71 We recognize the fact that the effects of DI on employment could potentially be different for 
heterogeneous groups of individuals and we leave the analysis of these differential effects for future 
work. In this chapter, our interest lied on the estimation of the average effects of increasing DI benefits 
on employment prospects of the entire group of disabled individuals. 
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Table 22 RD results +/-1 year around eligibility age threshold with individual controls for 
individuals who started claiming before age 55. 
Estimation on Individuals 
Aged 55 and +/- 1Year 
 
  
 
Discontinuity of DII Treatment Around Threshold 
(DII+– DII- ) 
.500 
(.002) 
.500 
(.002) 
.500 
(.002) 
.498 
(.002) 
Difference in EMP Around  
Threshold (EMP+– EMP- ) 
-.007 
(.002) 
-.007 
(.002) 
-.007 
(.002) 
-.005 
(.002) 
Estimated Effect of DII on EMP 
Participation (EMP+–EMP-)/ (DII+– DII- ) 
-.014 
(.003) 
-.015 
(.003) 
-.013 
(.002) 
-.010 
(.003) 
Proportion Female No Yes Yes Yes 
Proportion with Secondary Education No No Yes Yes 
Age Started Claiming Disability No No No Yes 
Number of Observations 138,121 138,121 138,121 138,121 
Number of Individuals 6,879 6,879 6,879 6,879 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter we analyze the employment effects of a 36 percent increase in the 
amount of disability benefits (DII) that is granted to almost 60 percent of the 
individuals aged 55 or above who are receiving a partial disability pension in 
Spain. The DI system in Spain allows partially disabled claimants to combine the 
receipt of benefits with income from employment without any implicit tax on 
labour supply being levied (and even providing for tax incentives to work).  
We exploit this discontinuity of DII provision from age 55 onwards and 
first use a straightforward fuzzy regression discontinuity approach to estimate the 
effect of treatment on EMP (which are likely to be endogenously determined). We 
generate RD estimates using different age windows, from +/-4 to 1 year before and 
after the cut-off age, which suggests that the increase in DI generosity reduces the 
probability of working by, at least, 3 percentage points.  
However, once we model more carefully for the impact of other individual 
characteristics we discover an acceleration of entry into DI of claimants aged 55 
and older which we believe is partly due to the increased generosity of available 
benefits. Once we take this phenomenon into account, and estimate the RD model 
only with individuals that entered the disability rolls before turning 55 years old, 
our results suggest that the employment of DI recipients would have been 8 
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percent higher had they not received the benefit increase. Since the replacement 
rate is in practice increased by 36 percent, this translates into an elasticity of DI 
generosity to EMP of approximately .22.  
These results are very much in line with the literature on the employment 
effect of DI almost unanimously concluding to a negative causal relationship. Our 
results nevertheless are an important contribution for two distinct reasons. Firstly, 
they are among the first, together with Gruber (2000), to focus on the impact of 
benefit generosity rather than entitlement. Secondly, the features of the DI 
institutional system we study make it possible to rule out that this impact stems 
from a substitution effect. As benefit receipt is not work contingent, it suggests that 
there is an important income effect at play in the work decision of older workers as 
observed by Autor and Duggan (2007, 2008). 
This latter point is important in terms of the efficiency of policy reforms 
since an income effect does not imply any deadweight loss. We believe this should 
be seriously considered in future reforms which may use the disincentive 
substitution argument to cut the benefits of a group in an already relatively weak 
income position. This is especially true considering the findings by Bound et al. 
(2004) that workers on average value increased benefits somewhat above the 
average cost of providing them.   
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Appendix; Tables and figures 
Figure 34 Description of the claiming process to access permanent disability benefits 
 
 
Source:  Own translation from the legislation available at the webpage of the Spanish  
Social  Security Administration. 
 5. Conclusion 
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This dissertation studies two broad aspects of the disability system in Spain, 
the inflow into the disability system and the labour market situation of individuals 
once they are on the disability rolls. Chapter 2 focuses on the first of these two 
aspects and analyzes the effects of the business cycle on transitions from 
employment to unemployment, inactivity and disability benefits for older 
individuals approaching retirement age. Chapter 3 gives an overall overview of the 
main characteristics of disabled individuals and their relation to the labour market 
and evaluates the effects of a policy introduced to raise the employment prospects 
of disabled women. Chapter 4 captures the disincentives to work provided by an 
increase in the amount of disability benefits for individuals who are older than 55 
and are deemed to have lower chances of finding a job.  
In this final chapter, we revise each of the previous chapters and highlight 
their main conclusions and policy implications. 
5.1 Business Cycle Effects on Labour Force Transitions 
for Older People in Spain 
Even if the inflow into disability benefits has not experienced a dramatic 
increase in Spain during the last years (as it has in other countries like The 
Netherlands or the USA), it is still important to understand which variables have 
an influence on this inflow rate and to what extent there is a situation of 
complementarity or substitution between the exits out of the labour market into 
unemployment, inactivity and disability benefits.  
In Chapter 2 we have applied two duration models in order to identify the 
effect of business cycle conditions on transitions out of the labour force for older 
individuals aged 45-59 in the Spanish economy. In the first part, we fit a logistic 
regression model for single exit transitions from employment to all the other non-
employment situations whereas in the second part we distinguish between exits 
from employment to either unemployment, inactivity or disability benefits with a 
competing risk duration model. This exercise allows us to understand the kind of 
transitions that are happening in the Spanish labour market for individuals 
approaching retirement age (but not yet entitled to neither retirement nor early 
retirement benefits) and to assess the contribution of business cycle conditions to 
these transitions. 
At the same time, we also include in the model dummy variables at ages 52, 
55 and 58 because of the existence of certain special schemes in the legislation that 
have the potential to facilitate the transitions at these ages. The aim is to test 
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whether the existence of these schemes induce people to behave accordingly and to 
do the transitions at exactly these ages. 
We highlight three main results that can be derived from our analysis. 
Firstly, business cycle conditions are found to be an important determinant in 
explaining transitions from employment to both unemployment and disability 
benefits. Our estimations suggest that individuals are more likely to enter into the 
disability rolls and receive disability benefits when the unemployment rate of the 
region in which they live increases as well as when the GDP growth of the country 
decreases. Therefore, business cycle conditions at both the local and the national 
level are important determinants for transitions out of the labour force for older 
individuals in Spain and, more specifically, they are strong determinants of the 
inflow into disability benefits. In terms of policy implications, this means that 
disability benefits are, to a certain extent, being used as an alternative tool to leave 
the labour force for individuals who do not have access to other benefits (such as 
unemployment) and are also being strategically used by firms to renew their 
labour force and substitute older workers by younger ones. 
Secondly, our results also show that the effect of the economic environment 
of the sector of activity is stronger in affecting transitions from employment to 
disability benefits than the effect of the economic environment in the region where 
the individual lives. 
Finally, we find that the special schemes available at ages 52, 55 and 58 
induce a strategic behavior from individuals and firms to leave the labour force at 
exactly these ages, particularly so for exits to unemployment benefits. 
Therefore, the authorities should be very careful when designing the rules to 
access disability benefits as, in many occasions, they induce individuals and firms 
to act strategically to maximize their opportunities and chances to get accepted into 
the system. Similarly, the use of the disability system as an alternative stabilization 
tool in times of economic downturns should also be revised by the government as 
this is not the objective of such a system and there are already other systems in 
place, such as unemployment and social assistance benefits, to serve this objective 
(although, from the point of view of the worker, they don’t offer a life-time 
income). 
5.2 Promoting Employment of Disabled Women in 
Spain: Evaluating a Policy 
There are several legislation measures in place in Spain that try to protect 
and promote the labour market opportunities of disabled individuals. However, 
these measures have never been properly analyzed before due to serious problems 
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in finding the right data for the evaluations. Therefore, we make use of a recently 
released administrative database from the Social Security Administration in Spain 
that contains information on both permanent disability benefits and employment 
and unemployment profiles of the individuals included in the sample to develop, 
in Chapter 3, the first analysis of the effectiveness of an employment promotion 
policy targeted towards disabled individuals. For this reason, after a process of 
reviewing all the legislation in place and the changes occurred since the 1980’s in 
Spain in terms of permanent disability benefits, we focus on evaluating the 
employment effects of a law that was introduced in 2004 which increased the 
deductions to the Social Security contributions paid by the employer that hired a 
disabled woman. The aim of this legislative change was to promote the labour 
market integration of disabled women as it was argued that this group of 
individuals was suffering from a double discrimination in the Spanish labour 
market.  
We proceed in our analysis in two steps. Firstly, we empirically investigate 
the evolution of the labour market situation of disabled individuals in Spain in the 
last 12 years and explore some of the characteristics of the composition of this 
sample of individuals. In doing so, we realize that there exists the possibility of 
having differential trends in the evolution of employment between men and 
women before the introduction of the policy change. For that reason, we estimate a 
model that evaluates the existence of any shift in the trend of employment in the 
women relative to the men sample following the policy change but introducing 
controls to condition on any preexisting trends (following Autor and Duggan, 
2008).   
Furthermore, in order to take into account the availability of both partial and 
total disability benefits in Spain and the interactions that this could have with 
employment prospects, we estimate a bivariate probit model with one equation 
capturing the labour market situation and the other one capturing the type of 
pension received.  
Our findings are pretty stable across the several specifications that we have 
estimated and suggest that the policy change boosts employment of disabled 
women vis-à-vis disabled men. However, this positive effect is only significant for 
the younger group of individuals in the sample, individuals below the age of 45. 
The policy turns out not to be significant for the older group of disabled women.  
Therefore, the question still remains to find the best policy to promote the 
labour market integration of older disabled individuals (in particular women) who 
seem to be less responsive to the financial incentives to employers.  
Moreover, our results suggest that further incentive measures and mediation 
mechanisms between disabled workers and employers need to be introduced in 
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order to maximize the potential positive results in terms of employment prospects 
of disabled individuals as the current measures are not fully used and many 
disabled workers claim to receive no help or guidance from the public 
administration services to find a job (EDAD survey 2008). 
5.3 The Employment Effect of Increasing Disability 
Benefits: A Regression Discontinuity Approach 
Even if in Spain individuals with a partial disability are given the change to 
receive 55% of the benefits while being completely allowed to work as much as 
they want, the data reveals that, in reality, only a few of them do actually work. 
Having such a dual system in which disabled individuals are divided between 
partial and total disability according to their degree of disability and their 
remaining capacity to work is what other countries, such as the USA, have been 
claiming for.  
Most of the criticisms to disability policies in the literature have focused on 
the potential disincentives to work embedded in the system. As the OECD 
suggests, maybe one of the reasons why so few partially disabled individuals in 
Spain are effectively working is found on the disincentives to work derived from 
within the system.  
Again, this is a topic that has never been properly analyzed for the case of 
Spain and is the central aim of Chapter 4. In this chapter we focus on a law that 
allows for a 36% increase in the amount of disability benefits (from 55 to 75% of the 
regulatory base) received by partially disabled individuals who are 55 (or older) 
and who are, as a result of their lack of skills and of the labour market conditions 
they face, deemed unlikely to find a job. As the selection process for being treated 
(receiving the increase) is conditional on having a low probability of employment, 
traditional diff-diff strategies will give biased results. 
Therefore, our approach is to explode the fact that selection for treatment is 
clearly defined by age in order to apply regression discontinuity (RD) models. We 
use two alternative RD specifications; a traditional fuzzy RD and a second one in 
which we restrict the sample to individuals who joined the disability rolls before 
turning 55. We introduce this new specification as we corroborate the existence of 
non-linearities of this covariate (age at which they start receiving disability 
benefits) around the eligibility age threshold. We interpret this as evidence that the 
benefit increase accelerates the entry rate into DI of individuals aged 55 and over. 
We include 4 different samples of individuals +/- 4 (+/-3, 2 and 1) years around the 
age threshold and apply the estimation methods mentioned above. 
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Our results suggest that traditional OLS and fixed effects models with a 
dummy variable capturing the treatment effect significantly overestimate the effect 
of the policy in reducing employment (EMP) of disabled individuals. Our 
traditional RD results report a statistically significant reduction of the probability 
of working by 3 percentage points as a result of the increase in the generosity of 
benefits. However, once we restrict the sample to individuals who joined DI before 
age 55, the new estimates suggest that the policy decreases employment 
probability by 1 percentage points (as the average employment rate for this sample 
is 12.5 percent, a 1 percentage point decrease corresponds to an 8 percent drop in 
employment probability).      
 Therefore, in this chapter we quantify the effect of increasing disability 
benefits on employment of disabled individuals in a system in which benefit 
receipt is not work contingent. We interpret this result as evidence of the existence 
of an income effect instead of a substitution effect, in line with the argumentation 
in Autor and Duggan (2008). Furthermore, our results are very similar to what has 
been previously obtained in the literature, particularly in the case of Gruber (2000) 
which estimates an elasticity of benefits with respect to employment of 0.28-0.36 
for an increase of 36% in disability benefits in Canada. Our estimates translate into 
an elasticity of 0.22 also for an increase of 36% in the benefits. 
5.4 Main Policy Implications and Further Work 
As we have summarized in this concluding chapter, each of the topics 
analyzed throughout this book has resulted in a number of policy implications. 
Adopting an overall look, the main conclusions that can be extracted from this 
book point to the need to reform the disability system in Spain in order to 
introduce real incentives for disabled individuals to find a job as well as to abolish 
a number of legislative measures which provide, from the one hand a clear 
incentive to join the disability rolls at certain ages and from the other hand, 
disincentives for partially disabled individuals to search for a job at other ages.  
As the inflow into the disability rolls has not experienced a dramatic 
increase in Spain during the past years, the government has not been pressured to 
introduce any important reform in the system and it has not made any serious 
attempt to foster the integration in the labour market of partially disabled 
individuals which would, in turn, improve and facilitate their integration in the 
society as a whole.  
When designing and implementing this needed reform of the disability 
system, a particularly important emphasis should be placed in the case of older 
disabled individuals and disabled women, as they have proved to be two of the 
most difficult targets in terms of employment integration policies. 
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Therefore, the Spanish authorities should basically focus their reform efforts 
on four main points: 
1. Abolishing the incentive effects of joining the disability rolls at certain 
ages, which have been documented in chapter 2 of this book. 
2. Abolishing the disincentives to work provided by the system at age 55, 
which have been documented in chapter 4 of this book. 
3. Introducing new incentives (or monitoring the current unfulfilled 
obligations) of employers to hire disabled workers. As chapter 3 of this 
book has documented, the current ones prove to have limited effects. 
4. Introducing new mechanisms and institutions to help disabled individuals 
in the job search process in order to decrease the search effort needed and 
to improve the match between the characteristics of the disabled 
employee and the needs of the firm. 
As for future work, the idea is to extend the analysis done in chapter 2 to an 
European context in order to study whether the effects of the business cycle at the 
level of the regions and the economic sectors that are found for the Spanish case, 
can also be generalized to the European context.  
For the Spanish context, further work needs to be done to study the 
incidence of temporary disability and sickness benefits as a stabilization tool in 
response to fluctuations of the business cycle and its interactions with the 
permanent disability scheme. Particular attention needs to be placed to identify 
how the labour market transitions documented in this book have been affected by 
the current economic crisis.   
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7. Nederlandse Samenvatting 
Arbeidsongeschiktheidsbeleid heeft recentelijk veel aandacht gekregen in 
OECD landen, aangezien arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekeringssystemen één van de 
belangrijkste obstakels zijn in een poging om arbeidsmarkt participatie in 
ontwikkelde landen te laten stijgen (of dalingen in arbeidsmarkt participatie tegen 
te gaan.. Veel hervormingen zijn ingevoerd in de OECD landen om werkelozen 
aan het werk te krijgen en vervroegde pensioen schema’s af te schaffen. Deze 
hervormingen hebben, samengaand met economische groei, geleid tot dalingen in 
de werkeloosheidscijfers. Echter, deze positieve ontwikkelingen hebben zich 
vertaald in een hogere arbeidsongeschiktheid onder bevolkingsgroepen, specifiek 
onder oudere werknemers.  Tevens staat vast dat werkgelegenheids percentages 
van arbeidsongeschikten zeer laag zijn gebleven, ondanks stijgingen in de Bruto 
Nationale Inkomens. 
Daarom hebben zowel nationale als ook internationale autoriteiten de 
noodzaak ingezien om actie te ondernemen: ten eerste door een controle op / 
beperking van de instroom van mensen in de arbeidsongeschiktheids regelingen 
en ten tweede, door invoering van reintegratiebeleid voor arbeidsongeschikten op 
de arbeidsmarkt, voor die groep die de capaciteiten heeft om (deels) aan het werk 
te blijven.  
Dit onderzoek richt zich op deze twee beleidsdoelstellingen en is gedeeld in 
drie delen. In het eerste hoofdstuk richten we ons op de effecten van de 
conjunctuurcyclus en de (wetgeving gedreven) leeftijdseffecten op de transitie van 
werkend naar werkeloos, inactief of arbeidsongeschikt. Het doel van het 
onderzoek is het bepalen van de mate waarin de conjuntuurcyclus zowel op lokaal 
als op national niveau een effect heeft op de overgang van werkend naar 
arbeidsongeschikt, voor individuen die de pensioensgerechtigde leeftijd bereiken. 
Het tweede en derde hoofdstuk richt zich op individuen die een permanente 
arbeidsongeschiktheids uitkering hebben ontvangen tussen 1996 en 2007 maar 
voorheen werkend waren. In beide hoofdstukken proberen we de effecten van een 
aantal wetten en hervormingen op de kans dat arbeidsongeschikten een baan 
vinden te schatten.  
Gedurende de periode 1996-2007 werd erkend dat arbeidsongeschikte 
vrouwen zich in een zeer kwetsbare positie bevonden op de arbeidsmarkt, in 
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vergelijking met hun mannelijke counterparts. In 2004 werd een hervorming 
geintroduceerd die de integratie van invalide vrouwen op de arbeidsmarkt moest 
bevorderen. In het tweede hoofdstuk evalueren we de werkgelegenheids effecten 
van deze hervorming, die zich uit in de vorm van een stijging van de kortingen in 
sociale zekerheidsbijdragen van werkgevers die arbeidsongeschikte vrouwen in 
dienst namen .   
In het derde en laatste hoofdstuk bekijken we het gebruik of misbruik van 
een wet die is geïntroduceerd in de 1980’s om een extra zekerheid te bieden aan 
gedeeltelijk arbeidsongeschikten, die in economische achtergestelde regio’s in 
Spanje woonden en lager opgeleid waren.  De wet biedt de mogelijkheid tot 
stijgingen van 36% in het pensioen van arbeidsongeschikte individuen, van 55 jaar 
of ouder die aan de bovengenoemde criteria voldoen, als erkenning voor de 
moeilijkheden die zij ondervinden bij het vinden van een baan in economisch 
minder goede tijden. 
De data die we gebruiken voor de drie hoofdstukken zijn die van de 
doorlopende steekproef onder werkenden (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, 
MCVL), een microeconomische dataset gebasseerd op administratieve data met 
meer dan een miljoen mensen. De referentie groep betreft individuen die werkten, 
werkeloos waren of een pensioen ontvingen (arbeidsongeschiktheid, ouderdom of 
wezen) in 2007, van wie de gehele werkgeschiedenis van 1980 tot 2007 is 
opgevraagd bij de Spaanse sociale zekerheidsadministratie. Voor elk van de 
hoofdstukken selecteerden we steekproefsgewijs een verschillende groep 
individuen uit deze dataset, afhankelijk van het onderwerp van het onderzoek. 
Om te controleren voor economische condities op regionaal niveau, hebben we 
macroeconomische informative over werkeloosheidscijfers en economische 
sectorgegevens per regio, als ook de groei in het bruto nationaal product  
achterhaald uit de gegevens van het Spaanse Instituut voor de Statistiek (17 
autonome regio’s of 52 provincies, afhankelijk welk onderzoek het betreft). 
Conjunctuur cyclus effecten op arbeidsmarkt transities voor oudere mensen in 
Spanje 
Zelfs nadat vervroegde pensioensregelingen waren afgeschaft of beperkt, 
vanwege hun nadelige gevolgen voor de werkgelegenheid, stegen de 
participatiecijfers op de arbeidsmarkt van oudere mensen niet. Deze ouderen 
vonden alternatieve manieren om de arbeidsmarkt te verlaten,tot ze de 
pensioensgerechtigde leeftijd hadden bereikt, met name door werkeloosheids en 
arbeidsongeschiktheids regelingen te gebruiken.  
In dit hoofdstuk analyseren we de kenmerken voor de stap van werkend 
naar werkeloosheid, arbeidsongeschikt of niet actief op de arbeidsmarkt, voor 
werknemers in de leeftijdsgroep 45-59, met specifieke aandacht voor de rol van de 
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conjunctuur cyclus op lokaal en nationaal niveau. Voor deze analyse gebruiken we 
twee modellen, te weten een ‘single exit logistic hazard model’ om de transitie van 
werkend naar alle niet werkende statussen te modelleren, en een “competing risk 
model” om onderscheid te maken tussen het uittreden van werkend naar 
werkeloos, arbeidsongeschikt of inactiviteit. We koppelden de informative over 
individuen uit de MCVL database met een aantal variabelen uit de data van het 
Nationaal Instituut voor de Statistiek van Spanje, die groei en werkgelegenheid in 
de verschillende regio’s in Spanje weergeven. 
Onze resultaten wijzen op sterke effecten van de variabelen die de 
conjunctuur cyclus meten op de transitie van werkend naar ontvanger van 
werkeloosheidsuitkeringen of arbeidsongeschiktheidsuitkeringen. Individuen 
hebben daarom een grotere kans om een arbeidsongeschiktheidsuitkering te 
ontvangen als de werkeloosheidscijfers in de regio waar ze wonenen stijgen, of als 
de economische groeicijfers op nationaal niveau dalen.  De conclusie is dat 
condities gerelateerd aan de conjunctuur cyclus op zowel lokaal en nationaal 
niveau in Spanje sterke determinanten van de instroom van ontvangers van een 
arbeidsongeschiktheidsuitkering zijn. Dit kan worden geïnterpreteerd als het 
strategisch gebruik maken van het arbeidsongeschiktheidssysteem als alternatief 
middel tot verwerving van inkomen in perioden van slechte economische 
omstandigheden. 
Het promoten van werkgelegenheid voor arbeidsongeschikte vrouwen in 
Spanje: het evalueren van het beleid 
Het arbeidsongeschiktheidssysteem in Spanje heeft vier verschillende 
uitkeringsvormen. De vorm wordt bepaald door de mate van 
arbeidsongeschiktheid, die zowel geheel als gedeeltelijk arbeidsongeschikten in 
staat stelt de uitkering te combineren met het uitvoeren van werkzaamheden (die 
in overeenkomst zijn met de mate van arbeidsongeschiktheid). Echter uit de data 
blijkt dat de meerderheid van de individuen in het system geen baan heeft, zelfs in 
een systeem met een dergelijke mate van differentiatie in de graad van 
arbeidsongeschiktheid en de mogelijkheden voor het ontvangen van een uitkering 
terwijl men werkt.  
Om die reden hebben de Spaanse autoriteiten sinds 1981 een aantal 
maatregelen geïntroduceerd,  die de arbeidsmarkt integratie van 
arbeidsongeschikten bevorderen. De belangrijkste onderdelen van dit beleid zijn 
werknemer quota’s van 2% voor bedrijven met meer dan 50 werknemers, 
antidiscriminatie wetgeving en kortingen in de sociale zekerheids bijdragen die 
betaald moeten worden door de werkgever van de arbeidsongeschikte werknemer. 
In het tweede hoofdstuk analyseren we de werkgelegenheidseffecten van 
een beleid dat in 2004 is ingevoerd, om de relatief nadelige positie van 
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arbeidsongeschikte vrouwen aan te pakken. Het beleid betrof hogere kortingen in 
de sociale zekerheids bijdragen voor werkgevers die arbeidsongeschikte vrouwen 
in dienst namen.  
Om de effecten van dit beleid op de werkgelegensheids kansen van 
arbeidsongeschikte vrouwen in Spanje te schatten, gebruiken we een ‘bivariaat 
probit model’ waarin we twee afhankelijke variabelen schatten (het soort uitkering 
en de werk situatie van de arbeidsongeschikte vrouw), om rekening te houden met 
niet geobserveerde variabelen in beide vergelijkingen. We volgen de methodologie 
geintroduceerd door Autor & Duggan (2008) en introduceren een aantal variabelen 
om te controleren voor de aanwezigheid van al bestaande trends in de 
ontwikkeling van werkgelegenheid voor vrouwen in vergelijking tot mannen.   
Onze resultaten zijn redelijk stabiel, in meerdere specificaties en wijzen op 
positieve maar kleine effecten van het beleidsinitiatief op de 
werkgelegenheidsmogelijkheden voor arbeidsongeschikte vrouwen ten opzichte 
van mannen. Echter, dit positieve effect is sterker en significanter voor de groep 
individuen ouder dan 45 jaar.  
Hieruit kunnen twee conclusies worden afgeleid die relevant zijn voor 
beleid. Ten eerste, moet er een alternatief beleidsinstrument worden gevonden dat 
effectief is in het promoten van werkgelegenheidsintegratie van oudere 
arbeidsongeschikte vrouwen (+45). Ten tweede is er een bredere hervorming nodig 
om verstrekkende resultaten te garanderen in termen van 
werkgelegenheidsvooruitzichten van arbeidsongeschikte individuen aangezien 
kleine geïsoleerde maatregelen een positief maar slechts klein effect hebben.  
Werkgelegenheidseffect van stijgende arbeidsongeschiktheidsuitkeringen: een 
discontinue regressive analyse 
De belangrijkste kritiek op arbeidsongeschiktheidssystemen in de literatuur 
(met name gericht op de USA en Nederland) is dat de beleidsmaatregelen / 
wetgeving een negatieve impuls creëren  om te werken. Dit effect is goed 
gedocumenteerd. Hoewel er nog geen overeenstemming is over de grootte van 
deze negatieve impuls, is er duidelijk consensus over het bestaan ervan.  
Door beperkingen in de beschikbare data, is dit onderwerp nooit eerder 
bestudeerd met betrekking tot het Spaanse arbeidsongeschiktheidsbeleid. Het doel 
van deze studie is daarom dit gat in de literatuur te dichten, door een analyse uit te 
voeren naar de werkgelegenheidseffecten van één bepaalde Spaanse wet. De 
betreffende wet biedt een  verhoging van 36% van de gedeeltelijke 
arbeidsongeschiktheidsuitkering voor individuen die 55 jaar of ouder zijn en die 
als gevolg van een gebrek aan kennis of capaciteiten in combinatie met de 
arbeidsmarktsituatie waarin ze zich bevinden, een kleine kans hebben om een baan 
te vinden.  
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Door het aanwezig zijn van selectie elementen in de behandeling, kunnen 
we geen traditionele “difference-in-difference” schattingstechnieken toepassen. We 
gebruiken daarom de discontinuiteit in het beleid op 55 jarige leeftijd en passen 
een discontinu regressie model toe om de invloed van geobserveerde en niet 
geobserveerde variabelen in acht te nemen.  
We gebruiken traditionele ‘discontinue regressie modellen (fuzzy design)’ 
Vanwege de aanwezigheid  van niet lineaire relaties m.b.t. de covariaat “leeftijd 
waarop de person het arbeidsongeschiktheids system betrad’, introduceren we een 
bepaalde specificatie waarin we de groep beperken tot individuen die voor hun 
55ste  levensjaar arbeidsongeschikt waren.  
Onze resultaten suggereren dat traditionele OLS en ‘vaste effecten modellen’ 
met een dummy variabele die het behandelingseffect meenemen, het effect van het 
beleid om arbeidsmarkt participatie van arbeidsongeschikten te beperken, 
significant overschat. 
De resultaten uit onze traditionele ‘Regression Discontinuety analyse’ laten 
een statistisch significante daling van 3 procent punten zien in de kans om aan het 
werk te komen, als gevolg van de stijging van de uitkering. Echter, als we ons 
beperken tot een steekproef met individuen die arbeidsongeschikt werden voor 
leeftijd van 55 jaar, suggereren de schattingen dat het beleid een daling in de kans 
tot werkgelegendeid van 1 procent teweeg brengt (de gemiddelde arbeidsmarkt 
participatie voor deze steekproef is 12.5 procent, een 1 procent punt daling komt 
overeen met een 8 procent daling in de kans op werk). 
In dit hoofdstuk kwantificeren we de effecten van een stijging van de 
arbeidsongeschiktheidsuitkeringen op de arbeidsmarkt participatie van 
arbeidsongeschikten in een systeem waarin het ontvangen van een uitkering niet 
afhankelijk is van het uitvoeren van werk. We interpreteren dit resultaat als het 
bewijs van het feit dat er een inkomenseffect is in plaats van een substitutieeffect, 
zoals Autor en Duggan (2008) concluderen. Verder komen onze resultaten zeer 
overeen met wat eerder is geconcludeerd in de literatuur. Dit is met name het 
geval voor het onderzoek van Gruber (2000) waarin hij voor Canada de elasticiteit 
van uitkeringen m.b.t. werk op 0.28-0.36 schat, voor een 36% stijging in de hoogte 
van de arbeidsongeschiktheidsuitkeringen. Onze schattingen geven een elasticiteit 
van 0.22 voor eenzelfde stijging van 36%.   
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